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REGULATORY CAPTURE, AND CORPORATE
SELF-REGULATION
WILLIAM W. BRATrON t
AND
JOSEPH A. MCCAHBRYt t
In this Article, Professors Bratton and McCahery explore,
in the larger framework of corporate governance, the positioning
of legal barriers to shareholder action regarding corporate charters.
The authors first trace the problems inherent in the management-
shareholder agency relationship and clarify the arguments
supporting and criticizing the two prevailing "deterrent" strategies
for regulating corporate management-fiduciary control and
market control. The authors adopt the view that a third
strategy-enforced self-regulation through institutional shareholder
participation-can be more effective, but stress economic
limitations on the class of situations in which shareholder initiative
can be expected to yield concrete governance benefits. The Article
contends that, given these limitations, the present allocation of state
and federal authority over corporate governance should be
adjusted in order fully t6 realize the potential benefits of
institutional shareholder participation. In the authors' view,
regulatory competition among the states causes state law unduly to
constrain the field of action for shareholder initiative in much the
same way that it already impairs the operation of the fiduciary and
market deterrents.' To support this view, the Article offers a
public-choice analysis of the charter competition system. Under
this, the system operates to embed the capture of state political
decisionmakers by corporate managers and only intermittently
promotes innovation and assures legal responsiveness to the
preferences of investors. This analysis leads the authors to
propose a federally mandated privilege of shareholder access to
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state corporate charters to approve amendments on matters of
process and structure. They argue that this proposal is well-suited
to the background of incentives that determine the level and
character of institutional shareholder participation, and that its
enactment would not impede the operation of charter competition
systems in its beneficial aspect.
INTRODUCTION
Corporate law currently faces the problem of effectuating
contractual governance in an agency system that insulates agents from
market constraints.' This governance discussion focuses on pos-
sibilities for strengthening the shareholders' role in the ongoing
negotiation of incomplete corporate contracts. Proponents of
institutional shareholder participation have taken the lead by mapping
out shareholder-driven strategies for monitoring and compensation
systems that will more effectively control the costs of management
influence activities within the firm These strategies force
proponents to confront long-standing economic and legal barriers to
shareholder action.
In this Article, we carry this legal confrontation to subject matter
so far largely exempted from the discussion-state corporate law and
the system of incentives that forms it. More particularly, we
recommend partial federal preemption of state law's allocation to
management of agenda control over corporate charter amendments.
We argue that this intervention will ameliorate some of the cost and
incentive barriers that impede shareholder action.
This recommendation requires us to confront the theory of
regulatory competition that legitimates the state system. We base our
challenge to this theory on a reinspection---conducted without the use
of a general equilibrium lens3 -of the internal negotiating structure
that forms corporate law. This reinspection reveals that charter
competition results in state laws that inhibit the negotiation of
contract terms that could both alleviate problems of informational
1. Cf. Jason Scott Johnston, The Influence of THE NATURE OF THE FIRM on the
Theory of Corporate Law, 18 J. CORP. L. 213,241-44 (1993) (noting that contractarian firm
theories that rely on market constraints provide no account of the mechanisms that will
lead to long-run efficiencies) (citing PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, OR-
GANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 192-94, 277-79 (1992)).
2. See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, An Economic Approach to Influence Activities
in Organization, 94 AM. J. SOC. S154, S156 (Supp. 1988).
3. That is, we do not assume that competition among the states in the production of
corporate law, taken alone, over time will assure the evolution of an optimal legal regime.
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asymmetry between managers and monitors and help to realign
incentives to reduce the costs of management influence.4 This Article
depicts a self-regulatory system, composed of firms and state
lawmaking institutions, in which competition among the states ensures
the system's capture by corporate management influence. It then
draws on political theory to provide a guide for dealing with the
problem. This learning from the field of public regulation highlights
the formative role that process and structure rules play in capture's
amelioration. We adapt it to the private corporate governance
situation and conclude that removing some of the states' mandatory
process rules would create opportunities for shareholder participation
in contract negotiation and for shareholder influence on the formation
of state law.
Part I provides an overview of our proposal for agenda access for
shareholder-proposed amendments to the firm's contract. This
discussion examines the objectives and strategies of the shareholder
participation movement in the context of corporate law's historic
debates over governance strategies and state lawmaking systems.
Part II critically reviews the market-based justification of the
charter competition system and the historic alternative of fiduciary-
based blanket federal preemption. It asserts that the market
perspective is infirm in two respects. First, it understates the effects
of regulatory capture because it fails to recognize that the system does
not provide shareholders with either an effective exit route, or, in the
alternative, an adequate opportunity to register political demands.
4. Cf. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the
Organization of Economic Activity, in PERSPECTIVES ON POSTIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY
57, 82 (James A. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990) (noting the role of distorted
information in the decision-making process of central authorities). Under Milgrom and
Roberts's "influence cost" model of the firm, the firm must confront problems of
informational asymmetry if it is to make and support efficient choices. The problem is that
decision-makers must obtain and rely upon information generated by others. Employees
and other players, by virtue of their place within the organization, possess information that
could have a significant impact on decisions made by principals. Absent sufficient
incentives to release these information rents, the agents will use this information to
influence the decisions of those above them in the hierarchy. According to Milgrom and
Roberts, the problem for an actor higher in the hierarchy attempting to monitor these
agents is this asymmetric information-the asymmetry "prevents easy determination of
whether a particular observed action or outcome corresponds to desirable behavior and
thus renders the problem nontrivial." Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 2, at 156.
Shareholder participation strategies seek to alleviate the asymmetric information
problem in the public corporation with devices such as process reforms (which take the
initiative in the design of internal incentive schemes away from management) and direct
placement of independent monitors in the boardroom. See infra notes 148-241 and
accompanying text.
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Second, the market perspective offers an overly simplistic picture of
the incentives that determine the behavior in Delaware, the leading
chartering state. In the capture model presented here, state-federal
political instability emerges as a positive force that occasionally forces
Delaware to confront conflicting demands of managers and
shareholders and effect a somewhat more even-handed mediation
between the two groups. The model also suggests caution in the
selection of a legal corrective to the capture problem: Discrete
federal intervention to facilitate shareholder participation in corporate
contracting emerges as preferable to blanket preemption. In our
view, federal preemption that institutionalizes an opportunity to
register conflicting demands on state lawmakers would not sacrifice
the relational advantages that flow from corporate law production in
a small, market-sensitive jurisdiction.
Part III examines the theories, accomplishments, and open
agenda items of the institutional shareholder movement. The
discussion describes and evaluates three participatory modes: discrete
issue-based voting contests, coalition-based voting for board seats, and
relational investment in large share blocks. Only the first mode
clearly passes the tests of cost-benefit feasibility and insusceptibility
to management capture. In practice, discrete voting contests have
occurred because they require low out-of-pocket costs and serve as
vehicles for reputational gain by a narrow segment of institutional
agents. These agents' reputational interests make them unlikely
candidates for capture. At the same time, reputational interests
render managers vulnerable to the institutions' dialogic activities and,
therefore, prone to make concessions. Contractual modifications have
resulted. The second participatory mode, coalition-based board
voting, holds out the promise of high-intensity monitoring with little
chance of capture due to absence of capital investment by, and
reputational profiles of, the hypothesized monitors. However, federal
regulation impedes experimentation, and there are substantial cost
and incentive barriers. The third mode, relational investing, solves
the problems of coalition-building by making the volunteer monitor
a substantial equity investor. In theory, this volunteer recoups its
costs as its equity block increases in value due to its input into the
firm's governance. Also in theory, this volunteer's public-regarding'
profile renders it impervious to the free ride taken by the rest of the
shareholders. Practical feasibility presents no problem in the sense
5. That is, activated by the interests of the shareholders as a group.
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that large block investments and attendant governance engagements
have long occurred in practice. However, a practical problem does
follow from the magnitude of the actor's investment. Large financial
stakes make sustained public-regarding relational engagements
unstable. Both capture by management in exchange for separately
negotiated rents and defection into the camp of a hostile offeror
remain structural possibilities.
Part IV asserts that practical barriers to experimentation with the
second and third modes of shareholder participation make it
worthwhile to recommend federal intervention against state-mandated
agenda control. This discussion details the restrictive effects of state
law's agenda mandate, describes the central role of charter com-
petition in the mandate's evolution, and proposes limited federal
intervention to ensure a shareholder privilege to initiate charter
amendments. We recognize that shareholder initiative could lead to
rent-seeking and the emergence of voting cycles. To ameliorate the
rent-seeking problem, the proposal limits access to matters of process
and structure. To cut off the cycling activity, the proposal includes a
set of ancillary process rules.
I. INTERNAL AND ]EXTERNAL GOVERNANCE STRATEGIES AND
STATE CORPORATION LAW
A. Deterrent Governance Strategies and State Charter Competition
An unsatisfactory organizational incentive scheme hampers the
performance of large corporations. Opportunistic managers often
exert excessive influence over their governance mechanisms,
exploiting a collective action barrier to effective monitoring by
dispersed equity owners. Solving this management-shareholder
agency problem is corporate law's long-standing, unperformed
assignment. Historically, debate over the appropriate solution has
centered on two competing deterrent strategies. The first, the
"fiduciary" strategy, is the corporate version of command and control
regulation. It follows from assertions by Berle and Means that
shareholders lack any effective means to monitor the firm themselves,
that no adjustment of shareholder incentives will cure the problem,
and that therefore the state must intervene to pick up the slack by
imposing mandatory rules.6 Under the strict regime envisioned,
6. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 219-21, 241-52 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1968) (1932).
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process rules that provide entrepreneurial lawyers with financial
incentives to enforce fiduciary norms address the shareholders'
collective action problem. The competing approach, the "market"
strategy, seeks to deter management shirking by clearing the field for
the operation of markets for products, management employment, and
corporate control. According to this view, economic actors in free
markets can be relied upon to protect themselves, and over time
collective action problems solve themselves as fit competitors survive
in a competitive environment. Here a different sort of entrepreneur,
the hostile tender offeror or proxy contestant, plays the critical
enforcement role.7
Most observers agree that an effective legal model must draw on
both modes of deterrence, but proponents of the two strategies
dispute the appropriate weighting of the legal mix. Proponents of
fiduciary control question the market's effectiveness in protecting
shareholders from management opportunism and see mandatory
fairness norms as necessary supports for systemic confidence. Market
proponents see fiduciary regulation as a barrier to the market's
operation in some cases, and otherwise as an unnecessary deadweight
cost, except where intervention proves necessary to facilitate the
operation of free transfers of corporate control.
This debate repeats itself when attention turns to the political
structure of corporate lawmaking. The federal systems leaves matters
of corporate organizational structure and fiduciary standards to the
states; corporations remain free to choose their states of incor-
poration.9 Since corporate charters produce rents for the states, the
states compete to attract charters. Proponents of fiduciary regulation
see this regulatory competition as a "race to the bottom": Since the
managers have captured the governance mechanisms of the states'
corporate customers, competition for charters by the states devolves
on the provision of special benefits to managers, weakening the
7. Compare Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control
Transactions, 91 YALE LJ. 698 passim (1982) (applying market strategy to sales of control)
with Victor Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and
Reorganization, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1072 passim (1983) (applying fiduciary strategy to sales
of control).
8. American corporate law has evolved with the national government assuming
responsibility only for regulation of information flow in the securities markets; it imposes
a mandatory disclosure regime on public corporations with a combination of administrative
and entrepreneurial enforcement techniques.
9. American conflict of laws rules respect the law of a corporation's nominal
domicile. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (1971).
1866 [Vol. 73
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
fiduciary regime. Therefore, a preemptive, fiduciary-based federal
corporate law regime is the recommended remedy.0 Market
proponents counter that market controls ensure that efficient
governance structures result as the states respond to the managers'
demands. This "race to the top" obviates any need for federal
intervention."
B. Institutional Investor Participation and a Strategy of Enforced Self-
Regulation
These debates over deterrent strategies and charter competition
have been complicated in practice by two developments, one negative
and the other positive. First, the negative: During the 1980s, state
lawmakers took an active role in impairing the market deterrent,
contributing to the collapse of takeover activity. This prompted
reappraisal of the race to the top and race to the bottom views of
charter competition and the emergence of an intermediate view
recognizing that competition has both positive and negative effects.
Next, the positive development: The collapse of the takeover market
coincided with the advent of active institutional investor participation
in corporate governance. 2 This prompted the articulation of a third
strategy for dealing with the agency problem: enforced self-
regulation. 3 Under this third strategy, shareholders can avoid the
10. The moft prominent advocate of this view was William Cary. See William L. Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 696-705
(1974).
11. The most prominent advocate of this view is Ralph Winter. See Ralph W. Winter,
State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD.
251 passim (1977).
12. These events had profound implications for corporate legal theory. It became
apparent that the theoretical resources of neoclassical economic analysis of law could not
adequately describe the events taking place. The result was a renewed interest in both the
politics of domestic corporate law and the comparison of foreign institutions. For
discussion of the break and the shortcomings of the comparative inquiry, see Richard M.
Buxbaum, Comparative Aspects of Institutional Investment and Corporate Governance, in
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3 passim (Theodor Baums
et al. eds., 1994).
13. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 101-04 (1992). Ayres and Braithwaite distinguish between
"enforced self-regulation" and "coregulation" in administrative law. Id. at 102. Under the
former, the state and the regulated firm negotiate over standards tailored to the firm. The
latter, which prevails in the U.S. securities industry, involves self-regulation by an industry
association with some oversight or ratification by the government. Ayres and Braithwaite
explore possibilities for enforced self-regulation on the theory that the subcontracting of
the regulatory function to private actors under ultimate government supervision could lead
to greater flexibility in the formulation of the terms of regulation and effectiveness of
18671995]
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need to rely on legal and market deterrents to the extent that they
effectively negotiate the corporate contract themselves and monitor
its performance.
Self-regulatory strategies are not new to corporate governance.
Indeed, self-regulation by means of a legally mandated shareholder
vote for the board of directors is the system's historic base point.
Commentators have debated plans to improve this self-regulatory
structure's performance for decades. However, since those earlier
proposals all followed from the Berle and Means assumptions, no one
expected that independent internal monitors could be imposed on
management by unilateral shareholder directive. Instead, the
proponents sought voluntary acceptance by management of oversight
by independent directors and pursued a dialogic implementation
strategy. The proponents advocated a norm of majority independent
board membership and attempted to have such a requirement inserted
into the canon of proper business practices. 4 Success was achieved
in form but not in substance: The norm found its way into the canon
only to be subverted in practice by management influence. By the
enforcement. Id. at 102-32.
We think the concept usefully describes the mode of corporate governance envisioned
by proponents of participation by institutional investors. The context is different, of
course. Here the enforcing actor is not a government agency but the firm's shareholders;
no immediately available sovereign mandate skews bargaining positions when the parties
negotiate over governance terms. Thus we do not employ the self-regulation concept to
import a "public" coloration into a "private" contractual matter. However, we do take the
position that state mandates are already inextricably bound up in the determination of the
potential scope of enforced self-regulation by shareholders and that their readjustment is
an appropriate subject matter for corporate law reform.
14. Mandatory independent board structure was proposed in the first draft of the
American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project, but was cut back to precatory
status in later versions at the insistence of management representatives. Compare
PRINCIPALS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.03 (Tentative Draft No. 1,1982) (proposing mandatory majority
of independent directors) with 1 PRINCIPALS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3A.01 (1994) (recommending majority of independent
directors as practice suggestion); see also MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF
THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 170-85 (1976) (recommending mandate). For
a review of the politics of the ALI Corporate Governance Project proceedings, see
Jonathan R. Macey, The Transformation of the American Law Institute, 61 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 1212 passim (1993).
Proponents of both fiduciary and market deterrence strategies took a dim view of
mandatory independent boards. Compare Victor Brudney, The Independent Direc-
tor-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village, 95 HARV. L. REv. 597, 609-12 (1982) (em-
phasizing that the directors' duty of vigilance would be constrained by their need to
interact with other directors) with Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance
Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1280-86 (1982) (arguing that use of independent
directors is detrimental to profit maximization).
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end of the 1980s, almost three-quarters of American directors were
outsiders; management nevertheless retained control of the selection
process, and sixty-three percent of the outside directors selected were
chief executive officers of other public companies. 5
Institutional investor participation changes this picture, holding
out a prospect of self-regulation enforced by the shareholders
themselves. The theory posits that concentrated institutional equity
ownership 6 makes joint shareholder action cost effective.'7 Prac-
tice has begun to validate the theory's prediction, as institutional
shareholders have used their voting power to get results. Successful
publicity and issue-based proxy campaigns against underperforming
companies have prompted management concessions on governance
provisions, and in the most dramatic cases, boardroom shakeups. 8
Theorists, however, ask for more thoroughgoing engagements than
these discrete and relatively inexpensive exercises can provide. They
have mapped strategies for sustained relationships between managers
and institutional monitors, looking to the use of institutional votes to
nominate and elect expert outside monitors, and the placement of
substantial blocks of shares with public-regarding institutional owners.
These more ambitious and costly proposals have not yet been tested
in practice.
Shareholder participation strategies are an attractive alternative
to the two deterrent strategies. The payoff for costly action by
shareholder volunteers comes from improved investment policy and
day-to-day management. This expands on the payoff of the fiduciary
deterrent and promises governance benefits formerly in the market's
exclusive preserve. Corporate law's duty of loyalty focuses on a
limited class of moral hazard 9 problems; its duty of care avoids
15. JAY W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE
REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 17-18 (1989).
16. This proportion passed 50% during the 1980s. See CENTER FOR LAW & ECON.
STUDIES, Institutional Investors and Capital Markets: 1991 Update, COLUM.
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR PROJECr, at Table 19 (1991).
17. See infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text. For an excellent review of the
proposals on the table, see Aleta G. Estreicher, Beyond Agency Costs: Managing the
Corporation for the Long Term, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 513, 593-612 (1993).
18. See infra notes 162-80 and accompanying text.
19. Milgrom and Roberts define moral hazard in terms of "postcontractual
opportunism that arises when actions required or desired under the contract are not freely
observable." See MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 167; see also Ian Ayres & Peter
Cramton, Relational Investing and Agency Theory, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1033,1044 (1994)
(suggesting that moral hazard "stems from the agent's 'hidden action' "). This framework
can be used to describe corporate law's garden variety conflict of interest transaction: A
board with insufficient information respecting incentives is more likely to approve one-
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inquiry into the adverse selectione ° problems that lead to unsuc-
cessful business plans. This limited scope follows from limited
enforcement resources: Judges intervening ex post can untangle
conflict-of-interest transactions and structure remedies, but infor-
mational complexities put investments and operations outside their
competence.2' The takeover, in contrast, addresses all of these
agency problems and, at least in theory, creates value for shareholders
through their elimination. However, its widespread employment
during the 1980s gave rise to a perceived problem of perverse effects.
It appeared that prospects for short-term gain could induce the
takeover of a well-managed firm, thereby chilling productive long-
term investment. It also appeared that readily available debt
financing could lead to speculative overbidding and subsequent
bankruptcy costs.
Shareholder participation strategies promise to avoid these
problems. They seek a competency payoff by placing effective
monitors inside the firm. There, with access to the full set of
information, the monitors will effect necessary changes through
sided deals; rationally apathetic shareholders will take no action in response.
20. Milgrom and Roberts define adverse selection in terms of the
kind of postcontractual opportunism that arises when one party to a bargain has
private information about something that affects the other's net benefit from the
contract and when only those whose private information implies that the contract
will be especially disadvantageous for the other party to agree to the contract.
MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 595. In this context, adverse selection stems from
the agent's hidden information. A board with inadequate information cannot fully
evaluate the agent's capabilities and performance, making it difficult to ensure the
selection of the most able agents. See Ayres & Cramton, supra note 19, at 1044. *
More generally, fiduciary law is ill-suited to the control of managers' influence
activities that have negative consequences for the firm. In the Milgrom and Roberts
model, influence activity is the time and effort spent by rational, self-interested actors in
firms to influence decisions. Some of this activity may benefit the firm, but it also results
in questionable pay increases, unnecessarily large budgets, acceptance of suboptimal
projects and proposals, and rejection of worthwhile proposals. See Milgrom & Roberts,
supra note 2, at S155-56.
21. This limitation of scope, embodied in the business judgment rule, stems from a
recognition of informational constraints on the process of judicial enforcement. The risk-
return calculations prevailing at the time of initial investment cannot be reconstructed ex
post, the fact of failure invites the ascription of incompetence to conduct better described
as considered risk-taking. Aggressive fiduciary inquiry into investment policy would over-
deter risky investment. The corporate duty of care, accordingly, strikes only at extreme
cases of incompetence. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885-86 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1051 (1983); Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614,615 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). The Delaware
Supreme Court has created an exception by strictly scrutinizing the process employed in
the boardroom of the acquired firm in a friendly merger. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,
Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 368 (Del. 1993); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985).
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cooperation and persuasion. The deterrent strategies, in contrast, lead
to punishment payoffs. The more widespread their use, the more a
management subculture of resistance to outside regulation becomes
entrenched.'
This picture of productive relational engagement by shareholders
is still largely aspirational. So far, institutional victories in discrete
engagements have followed from the efforts of agents of public
pension funds. These actors take the role of political entrepreneurs
and act from motivations more reputational than financial. Although
agents of private pension funds, mutual funds, banks, and insurance
companies control the overwhelming portion of institutional equity
holdings, they have not emerged as leading players in the game.'
It remains unclear whether concrete cash payoffs can be realized from
the loose cost-benefit projections that support the relational strategies.
A number of sticking points impede testing of the relational
models. First, no one has devised an incentive scheme that integrates
investment in governance participation with the range of agency
arrangements that obtain in the different investment institutions.24
Second, substantial legal impediments to shareholder collective action
remain on the books. Early pressure for reform has resulted in some
significant changes-paternalistic barriers to coordinated institutional
action in issue contests have been removed from the federal proxy
rules, but full-scale testing of relational models of shareholder
participation awaits the implementation of a broader program to
curtail the scope of the federal securities laws Third, a nascent
incentive problem lies unresolved in the interplay between self-
22. See AYRES & BR AITHWAITE, supra note 13, at 19-20. The participation strategy
also looks reasonable in a loose comparative cost survey. The institutional volunteers do,
of course, incur the up-front costs of campaigning, coalition building, or direct investment.
That investment does not occur, however, absent the prospect of a greater performance
payoff, and that payoff ultimately benefits the shareholders as a group. Meanwhile,
significant costs attending the deterrent strategies are avoided. Fiduciary law carries the
deadweight cost of corporate subsidy of hostile, labor-intensive judicial processes even in
the meritorious case, and additional costs from nonmeritorious cases stemming from the
unsolved problem of process incentives to plaintiffs' lawyers to hold up firms for quick
settlements. Takeovers, although said to create shareholder value overall, see, eg.,
Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J.
ON REG. 119, 152-54 (1992), do not necessarily benefit the shareholders of the acquiring
firm, see, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REv. 597,
614-15 (1989); Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. BUS. 197
passim (1986), and entail enormous transaction costs.
23. See infra notes 198-208 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 229-40 and accompanying text,
25. See infra note 244 and accompanying text.
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regulation by shareholders and market deterrence by takeover. The
institutional participation movement has proceeded during a cyclical
low in merger and acquisition activity. An upturn in the merger cycle
and resurgence of hostile activity26 would reweight the institutions'
payoff pattern away from patient engagement in favor of defection
and short-term gain. That, in turn, would diminish management's
incentive to cooperate.27
C. A Federally Mandated Privilege of Shareholder Initiative
Recent commentaries on shareholder participation focus on
barriers to the realization of the full relational models. This Article,
in contrast, examines the legal landscape that channels discrete
institutional interventions and explores possibilities for expanding the
menu of contractual reforms attainable through shareholder initiative.
In so doing, it constructs a theoretical case for a reform proposal
made in passing many times in the past-2. federal preemption of
state law's allocation to management of an exclusive privilege to
initiate corporate charter amendments. We revive this proposal with
two consequences in mind. First, recent institutional accomplishments
suggest that levelling of the state law playing field could lead to
26. An upturn in the merger cycle has occurred during the last two years, but hostile
takeover activity remains sporadic. See infra note 236.
27. At the same time, new incentives to defect to the management side would arise
in a case in which the shareholder volunteer holds a substantial block of stock and state
fiduciary law proves incapable of policing a side deal. See infra notes 232-40 and
accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic
Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 582 (1990) (proposing a federal requirement for public
companies that a majority of shareholders elect to be governed by changes in state law
that affect the division of power between management and shareholders); Cary, supra note
10, at 701-03; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of Corporate Federalism: State Competition
and the New Trend Toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards, 8 CARDOZO L. REV.
759, 774-77 (1987) (proposing shareholder initiative by the use of proxy statement to opt
out of state rules, amend the charter and change the state of incorporation); see also SEC
Concept Release on Takeovers and Contests for Corporate Control, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-23486, 51 Fed. Reg. 28,096, 28,100-02 (1986) (suggesting self-governance
exemptions to specific tender offer rules); SEC Advisory Committee Report on Tender
Offers, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), Special Report No. 1028, at 37-41 (July 8, 1983)
(recommending annual shareholder advisory votes on golden parachutes, standstill
agreements, and supermajority and disenfranchising charter provisions); cf. ROBERTA
ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 83-84 (1993) [hereinafter
ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW] (proposing change of statutory defaults from opt-
out to opt-in at the state level); Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence
and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV.
909, 944 (1994) (proposing that Congress should preempt state antitakeover statutes,
leaving shareholders to make decisions respecting takeover defenses).
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patterns of corporate contracting that begin to resemble those
resulting between actors at arms' length. Second, the combination of
institutional leadership and shareholder access to the charter could
invigorate the charter market. Given a path for the effective
registration of shareholder demands, states would have an incentive
to take shareholder preferences into account in the construction of
corporate law's mandatory provisions.
It is possible that rent-seeking by shareholder coalition-builders
could lead to perverse effects if an access mandate were extended to
matters of investment and other business decisions.29 Our goals are
modest, however, and their satisfaction does not require unlimited
shareholder access. Accordingly, we would limit the subject matter
scope of mandatory shareholder access to charter terms bearing on
governance process and structure. To prompt the reorientation of the
political calculations of state lawmakers, our operative concept of
permitted amendments would extend to the decision as to state of
incorporation.
This proposal also has a theoretical goal. The program to
restructure corporate law to accommodate the economic possibility of
shareholder-enforced self-regulation implies the adjustment of
prevailing notions of corporate federalism. An inconsistency has
developed in the commentary. On the one hand, no one questions
that state law's grant of control of the corporate voting agenda to
management restricts shareholder enforcement opportunities." On
the other hand, the law reform movement tends to press against only
the federal side of a two-sided system, foregoing consideration of the
state law (and federalism) implications of shareholder participation
strategies." This imbalance is surprising given the consensus view
that the competition-driven state system imposed excessive constraints
on the operation of the market deterrent during the 1980s.
Two explanations for the imbalance suggest themselves, one
practical, the other theoretical. First, proponents of shareholder
participation formulate their agenda with the urgency of activists,
29. On this point we follow Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice
and Game Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 347, 376-81 (1991)
[hereinafter Gordon, Shareholder Initiative].
30. See, e.g, Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REv. 811, 825-26 (1992) [hereinafter Black, Agents].
31. The exception is Gordon, Shareholder Initiative, supra note 29, at 357-59, which
concludes that the system confirms the prediction of the market efficiency story.
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either selecting immediately attainable improvements32 or confron-
ting unavoidable barriers to full realization. Charter access for
process and structure amendments fits neither proffle. The
complicated politics of federal intervention give it a low rank on the
feasibility list,33 and, in any event, access promises incremental rather
than fundamental improvement in the agency relationship. Second,
conceptual barriers impede reappraisal of the regulatory allocation
between national and state governments. The reform agenda reflects
the view that shareholder-enforced self-regulation is perversely
impeded by federal regulations promulgated long ago by actors under
the influence of Berle and Means.' Historically, suggestions for
federal preemption have followed from the same, discredited35 set of
assumptions. More recent arguments for federal preemption have
taken steps to cure this infirmity by bringing to bear both a relational
contract perspective and the economic presuppositions of the market
deterrent approach.36 However, the cure is incomplete because these
new calls for preemption continue to include the Berle and Means
remedy of a state-mandated fiduciary deterrent.37 Still unaddressed
is the central federalism concern that federal intervention imports a
risk of blanket preemption that destroys the responsive benefits of
jurisdictional competition.38 As a result, the market competition
32. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time
Report, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 837, 900-02 (1994) [hereinafter Coffee, Half-Time Report]
(suggesting implementation by SEC rulemaking); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman,
Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV.
863, 865, 883-84 (1991) [hereinafter Gilson & Kraakman, Institutional Agenda] (proposing
institutional board monitors by means of shareholder self-help); Joseph A. Grundfest, Just
Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L.
REv. 857, 903-08 (1993) (recommending purely dialogic strategy).
33. See ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 50, 75-84.
34. Or, more generally, it follows from early twentieth century populism. See, e.g.,
Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 10,
32-45 (1991).
35. Here we speak from the point of view of others. In our view, the Berle and
Means description may or-may not carry force in the future, depending on the success of
the shareholder participation movement.
36. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1435, 1458-67 (1992); David
Charny, Competition Among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Law Rules: An
American Perspective on the "Race to the Bottom" in the European Communities, 32 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 423, 442-53 (1991).
37. See Bebehuk, supra note 36, at 1500-07.
38. ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 82-83.
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model of state law still carries sufficient validating force to discourage
consideration of structural adjustments.3 9
The federalism discussion should be disaggregated and the
benefits and burdens evaluated in light of the regulatory strategy that
informs a specific proposal for intervention. That step accomplished,
a powerful case emerges for minimal intervention to increase the
menu of subjects for shareholder initiative. The recent,
unprecedented success of the shareholder activists invites
reexamination of legal restrictions on shareholder voice for the first
time since the restrictions appeared in state law a century ago.4 The
charter competition system prevents states from undertaking this
review because it effects the capture of state lawmakers by
management interests. There is, of course, nothing intrinsically
unacceptable about a captured sovereign, as the political theory
undergirding the market justification of the system teaches. Never-
theless, nothing in that theory also dictates the conclusion that this
particular situation of capture enhances economic welfare. Previously,
that conclusion was reached only on two assumptions: market
constraints in any event cure the capture's negative effects; and state-
mandated agenda control is irrelevant because collective-action
constraints prevent shareholders from availing themselves of an
opportunity to voice preferences internally. Neither assumption is
safe today; state lawmakers undercut the first during the 1980s, and
institutional shareholders thereafter rendered the second obsolete.
Thus, the legal terms that perpetuate the one-sided capture of
state law need no longer be accepted as the best available, provided
that the proposed adjustment makes both the captured sovereign and
the regulated firm more responsive to the excluded shareholder
interest. However, any proposed federal adjustment also must leave
unimpaired such benefits of responsiveness to the preferences of
actors in economic organizations as the state system does provide.
The minimal intervention suggested here meets that burden.4'
39. For a manifestation of this thinking in a federal lawmaking context, see S. REP.
No. 265, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1987) (observing that state corporate laws work well
and that Congress has always decided against federalization).
40. See infra notes 275-83 and accompanying text.
41. To keep the discussion manageable, we avoid mentioning. the problem of
constituency participation. We acknowledge, however, that this corporate governance
problem is closely related to that of shareholder access and ultimately must be confronted
as corporate law evolves to accommodate institutional investor initiatives. Accordingly,
our focus on the shareholder interest should not be taken to presuppose adherence to the
shareholder primacy norm implicit in much of the governance literature. Richard M.
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More broadly, a strictly market-based theory of regulatory
competition provides an inadequate framework for appraising the
law's role in facilitating effective organizational incentive schemes.
42
The market-based model understates the distortions that result from
the interplay of multiple sovereigns and interest groups in the
resolution of corporate commitment, information, and enforcement
problems. These problems stem in part from the capture of a
sovereign mandate by one contracting group and in part from the
absence of a contractual avenue for realignment of the sovereign's
incentives by the competing group. This mixed problem of economics
and politics calls for a mixed political and economic solution. Ideally,
the political solution should be shaped to leave the ultimate resolution
of the corporate agency problems to the economic actors themselves,
and leave sovereign actors with incentives to make balanced responses
when their preferences conflict. Federal intervention would facilitate
that result if it refrained from displacing the states' role in corporate
law creation and instead realigned the positions of the three parties
to the corporate contract-management, shareholders, and state
government-to allocate shareholders a seat at the bargaining table.
II. CORPORATE CHARTER COMPETITION AND THE PROBLEMS OF
REGULATORY CAPTURE AND REGULATORY RESPONSIVENESS
This part of the Article reconsiders the debate between critics
and proponents of charter competition and proposes a modified
description of the system. From the critics' perspective, the charter
market facilitates managerial capture of state lawmakers and prevents
the evolution of an effective fiduciary deterrent. The proponents, in
contrast, applaud market impediments to the development of fiduciary
controls and describe a mechanism that assures state responsiveness
to the preferences of economic actors. We assert that neither position
remains viable in the present environment. The critics tend to
overstate the problem: Capture, taken alone, does not delegitimate
Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A Comparative Perspective, 57
BROOK. L. REv. 1, 41 (1991), notes that institutionalized labor-management cooperation
along European lines need not be a zero-sum game, and we agree. We also think that
Buxbaum, id. at 42-45, plausibly looks to governance innovations stemming from
institutional initiatives as a potential beginning point in the evolution of American
analogues to codetermination.
42. Such schemes allow opportunistic actors to overcome collective action problems
in pursuit of the gains of trade, promoting mutual compliance er post and allowing for
credible commitments ex ante. See Terry M. Moe, Politics and the Theory of Organization,
7 J.L. ECON. & ORGS. 106, 122 (Special Issue 1991).
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a regulatory regime. They also tend to overplay the solution: By
displacing Delaware courts from their position as corporate law's
leading center of dispute resolution, mandatory federal fiduciary
standards would impair and possibly terminate the operation of a
useful repository of information and expertise. The proponents tend
to understate the problem: They describe a relational contract
without fully exploring its political and process characteristics. This
relational contract contains not only normative mandates, but also
process mandates that govern the alteration of default terms.
Furthermore, the capture of the mandating sovereign by one of the
parties has prevented the evolution of both optimal mandates and
effective ground rules for opting out. The proponents also tend to
avoid sustained consideration of solutions: The federal mandate can
be directed to the process side, not only to level the playing field for
corporate contracting, but also to destabilize a structure that affords
the states the comfort of having to respond to the demands of only
one affected interest group.
A. The Corrupt Sovereign Versus the Responsive Sovereign
The original case for federal intervention against state charter
competition combined a public interest theory of regulation with a
fiduciary strategy for improving corporate law. Professor William L.
Cary's leading article denounced Delaware, the leading corporate
domicile,4 3 as a corrupt sovereign. He undertook a general review
of its courts' pronouncements and concluded that there appeared to
be "no public policy left in Delaware corporate law other than the
objective of raising revenue."'  To Cary, the "public policy" at stake
was the integrity of corporate managers, and the revenue objective
had led a single state to "grant management unilateral control
untrammeled by other interests,"45 thereby sacrificing the national
interest. He looked to federal intervention to eliminate the firms'
incentives to incorporate in Delaware. 6
43. Delaware is home to one-half of the largest American corporations, and is the new
domicile of 80% of reincorporating firms. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some
Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORGs. 225, 244 (1985) [hereinafter
Romano, Law as Product].
44. Cary, supra note 10, at 684.
45. Id. at 698.
46. Id. at 702. His proposal included not only federal fiduciary standards, but
shareholder access to the charter and by-laws, the abolition of nonvoting shares, and
mandatory indemnification rules. Id.
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Cary assumed that regulation could and should pursue a notion
of the general good. By the time he published his thesis in 1974,
however, that theory of regulation had already fallen from favor in
the social sciences 7 and was replaced by capture theories of
regulation.' Capture theories described regulation as an arena in
which special interests compete to use government power for
advantage. They also debunked the public interest story of regulatory
motivation-now regulators should be expected to behave no
differently than actors in private economic relations. 49 This shift in
political theory, coupled with the emerging market deterrent view of
corporate law, permitted Cary's race to the bottom to be reversed
into a race to the top."
The "race to the top" story drew on the central assertion of
regulatory competition theory-that jurisdictional competition
ameliorates the distortions that result as interest groups compete for,
and win, political favors. Under this theory, competition for
domiciliaries leads to the matching of government policies with
diverse citizen preferences, and thus fosters innovation."1 Citizens
signal their preferences respecting legal goods and services when theymigrate from regime to regime. Their ability to exit disempowers
government actors, whose welfare diminishes as citizens depart, taking
with them votes and revenues.52 Given competition, law production
goes forward without losing time on the task of reconciling competing
preferences. The theory also implies a preference for state over
national lawmaking. Since the revenue enhancement constraint on
the national government is less intense, 3 the national lawmaking
47. See Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest,
and the Public Agenda. Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORGS. 167, 167 (1990).
48. Mancur Olson attacked the optimistic public interest orthodoxy of American
political science as built on a misguided conception of the logic of group action. MANCUR
OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECrIVE ACrION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS 16-22, 117-31 (1965). Olson claimed that the liberal view that groups formed
organizations based on common goals ignored free riding by members of the group. Id.
at 15-16. Since most of the gains from group formation could be captured by all, there was
very little incentive for groups to organize. Id. at 14-16.
49. Levine & Forrence, supra note 47, at 168-69.
50. See Winter, supra note 11, at 254-62.
51. See ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 4-6.
52. See Ronald J. Daniels, Should Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive
Corporate Law Market, 36 MCGILL L.J. 130, 142-43 (1991).
53. ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 4-6,48-51.
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process will be slower, less responsive to productive concerns, and
more susceptible to the influence of organized interest groups.
54
Regulatory competition theory applies to corporate law on the
assumption that state corporation codes may be viewed as products
consumed by corporations.5 In the resulting description, com-
petition for the legal business of firms forces the states to adapt the
law to the dynamic conditions in which the firms operate.56 State
lawmaking emerges as a trial and error process suited to the accurate
identification of optimal corporate arrangements.57
Reincorporating firms are this market's marginal consumers.
They seek a predictable legal regime that reduces their costs.
Delaware provides this with comprehensive case law, well-specified
indemnification rules, and an expert judiciary.58 The firms also seek
a guaranty that the new state of domicile will maintain the desirability
of its code, because the reincorporating firm and the target jurisdic-
tion enter into a relational contract that entails a risk of opportunistic
breach. Even as the firm invests to gain access to the target's
favorable legal regime, the target remains free to change its politics
and transform itself into an unresponsive jurisdiction.59  The com-
54. Id. at 5. In a federal system, the allocation of lawmaking power to the competing
states also protects individuals from the power of the national government; private
organizations provide an additional check by counterbalancing the power of state
governments. National regulation of corporations would impair this corporate function
and thus detract from individual liberty. See Roberta Romano, The State Competition
Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REv. 709, 753 n.97 (1987).
55. ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 6.
56. Delaware, the leading corporate law state, excels in this process. Id. at 9.
57. Romano's study of the spread of innovation in corporation codes found that
innovations spread rapidly in a pattern resembling the S-shaped diffusion curve of
technological innovations. Romano, Law as Product, supra note 43, at 234-35. Her study
of state responsiveness, id. at 237-40, found that the more responsive states gain more and
lose fewer incorporations, and that state responsiveness bears a significant positive
correlation to the proportion of state revenues derived from franchise taxes, id.
58. ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 32-40. Romano has
backed this cost-reduction assertion with a study of public corporation domicile changes
between 1960 and 1982. See Romano, Law as Product, supra note 43, at 242. The study
shows that corporations tend to change domiciles in advance of either a public offering,
an acquisitions program, or the promulgation of antitakeover measures. Id at 250. They
incur substantial costs in so doing, including the one-time costs of the move, the possibility
of appraisal claims, and, in the case of corporations moving to Delaware, the present
negative value of an additional layer of high franchise taxes. ROMANO, GENIUS OF
CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 34-35. The benefits mostly stem from the threat of
litigation-all three of the identified transactional occasions for changes of domicile entail
litigation risks.
59. New Jersey did this early in the twentieth century, precipitating a mass movement
of corporations across the river to Delaware. Joel Seligrnan, A Brief History of Delaware's
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petitive jurisdiction has to reduce this possibility by offering a credible
commitment. Delaware's commitment stems from its dependence on
franchise tax revenues. ° These revenues are an "intangible asset"
that emerges from the combination of a large number of incor-
porations and a small population. Delaware also invests in real assets
specific to its incorporation business-its case law and its judicial and
administrative expertise. These, together with Delaware's code,
constitute reputational capital. Delaware protects this storehouse of
capital by imposing internal process and structure rules that deter
political disruption." This store of capital bolsters the state's market
position. Other states cannot credibly precommit to offer superior
service, and thus are deterred from incurring the necessary start-up
costs. A first-mover advantage in Delaware results.62
As originally articulated, this market-based race to the top
validation of state law bypassed the problem of the shareholders' lack
of influence over state lawmaking with a reference to the control
market deterrent. The assertion, in effect, was that the managers'
General Corporation Law of 1899, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 249, 265-70 (1976).
60. ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 38-39. Franchise taxes
amounted to 17.7% of Delaware's total tax revenues in 1990. Id. at 10.
61. These include its direction of corporate matters to a specialized chancery court,
its practice of appointing rather than electing its judges and limiting them to 12-year terms,
and its requirement of two-thirds majorities in both houses of its legislature for the
approval of corporation code amendments. Id. at 38-42.
62. Id. at 40-44. The store of capital also fosters reciprocal dependencies between
Delaware and its customers. The lawyers who recommend reincorporation to client
corporations invest in Delaware expertise, and thus have incentives to recommend it as a
destination. Their clients need to economize on legal costs, and thus tend to stay in place.
For competing explanations, see RICHARD A. POSNER & KENNETH E. ScorT, ECONOMICS
OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 111 (1980) (finding that large firms
go to Delaware); Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in
the Theory of the Firm, 28 J.L. & ECON. 179, 190 (1985) (finding that firms with
concentrated ownership do not go to Delaware).
The basic model of the "first-mover advantage" is that of Michael Spence. See
Michael A. Spence, Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing, 8 BELL J. ECON.
534, 534-44 (1977). Under it, an oligopolist must commit resources to a certain level of
production; a potential entrant can observe this, and must decide whether to enter and
produce at a certain level. Id. at 534. Spence's entry deterrence model assumes a two-
stage game in which one firm may enjoy a first-mover advantage if it can choose its
quantity first: Because firm one uses its excess capacity to deter firm two's entry, quantity
has a commitment value. Id.; see also JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL OR-
GANIZATION 317-22 (1988) (reviewing the Spence-Dixit model and interpreting it as a
double capacity game, with production as the first capacity constraint and selling capacity
as the second); Avinash Dixit, A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry Barriers,
10 BELL J. ECON. 20, 20-32 (1979) (finding that "a great absolute advantage in demand
(or cost) for established firms makes entry harder, but lower cross-price effects with
potential entrants' products make entry easier").
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option of exit adequately disciplined the states, while the possibility
of shareholder exit by tender to a hostile offeror adequately dis-
ciplined the managers. This story lost its persuasiveness as managers
and state politicians collaborated' to hamper the market deterrent
with the antitakeover legislation of the 1980s.' This manifest case
of charter market failures reinforced the opponents' assertion that
management capture of the states leads to suboptimal lawmaking.
Following the lead of Roberta Romano,66 the market deterrent
school moved to a middle ground position on charter competition.67
From that perspective, they defend the state system, except to the
extent that it inhibits the control market.
Others, principally Lucian Bebchuk, returned to the attack.68
63. Although this is interest group legislation, it did not result from the efforts of a
centrally-organized management lobbying effort. Romano's case study of the state
legislative process here suggested that the statutes are initiated by threatened managers
of local corporations and their assistants in the local corporate bar rather than by broad
coalitions of business, labor, and community leaders. See Roberta Romano, The Future
of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 457, 461 n.11
(1988).
64. The statutes evolved in succeeding generations. The first generation submitted
tender offers to substantive review by state securities administrators; those statutes were
held unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624,
640 (1982). The second generation limited the subject matter scope to regulation of
internal corporate affairs. These statutes tend either to condition the voting right of
bidders on the approval of the shareholders as a whole, impose freeze periods on
combinations between bidders and targets, or require that an equal price be paid in the
second stage of a two-tier acquisition. Some statutes combine these elements. These
statutes survived constitutional challenge in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481
U.S. 69, 94 (1987). Another variety confirms the legitimacy of board consideration of the
constituents' interests other than shareholders in takeover defense situations. For a
summary, see ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 53-57.
65. A large body of empirical work confirms that the antitakeover statutes had a
harmful effect on shareholder value. This empirical result emerges from a complex picture
that encompasses the negative price effects of contractual antitakeover provisions such as
poison pills. For a summary of this work, see ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW,
supra note 28, at 60-75.
66. See Romano, Law as Product, supra note 43, at 281.
67. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCrURE OF CORPORATE LAW 222 (1991) (concluding that the race to the top stands
as refuted, but the proposition that competition creates a "powerful tendency" to enact
shareholder beneficial laws remains vital); Ralph K. Winter, The "Race for the Top"
Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1526, 1528 (1989) (expressing
more confidence in the view that Cary was wrong than in the view that state competition
results in a race to the top).
68. Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 1458-75; see also Charny, supra note 36, at 456
(promoting "harmonization," the promulgation of corporate rules by a central authority);
Roberta S. Karmel, Is It Time for a Federal Corporation Law?, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 55, 91-
96 (1991) (endorsing the promulgation of uniform federal corporate law); Joel Seligman,
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Bebchuk argued that the middle ground69 result stems from a
structural defect in the competitive system that disables the produc-
tion of a maximizing legal regime. The market leads the competing
states to focus on the variables that influence reincorporation
decisions.' There follows from this a concern for management
preferences rather than shareholder value itself. Accordingly, nothing
deters the states from pursuing policies of management accom-
modation with regard to the fiduciary and market deterrents. 1
Bebchuk concluded that because of this oversight, federal fiduciary
standards should preempt most state takeover regulation.7
The renewed debate on the desirability of federal intervention
continues among those occupying different middle-ground views of
charter competition. At the foundation of this debate lies the
allocation of the theoretical burden of proof for or against interven-
tion, the assumption being that the side bearing the burden loses the
game. Sevral points are sharply controverted. Opponents of
intervention point to a body of event studies showing that reincor-
poration in Delaware does not reduce shareholder value; proponents
argue that convergence among the states on the basic points of
corporate law denudes the results of persuasiveness.73 Opponents
The Case for Minimum Corporate Law Standards, 49 MD. L. REv. 947, 971-74 (1990)
(same); Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 60-63 (1993)
[hereinafter Seligman, New Corporate Law] (same).
69. Bebehuk, supra note 36, at 1440-41. Bebchuk began his analysis of the problem
by stating his assumption that, absent reasons to the contrary, state competition is more
likely to produce an efficient rule than federal regulation. Id.
70. Id. at 1452-54.
71. Bebchuk identified a category of "insignificantly redistributive," management-
favorable rules that always escape the market constraint. Id. at 1462. Bebchuk
hypothesized a transaction undertaken by a $1 billion firm that reduces shareholder value
by $1 million for the purpose of returning $200,000 to management. Id. at 1463. The
transaction is too small to excite a takeover, but as long as state law opens the door,
management has every incentive to undertake it. Id. In addition, competition can cause
the states to use their lawmaking power to impair the strength of market discipline even
further, as the proliferation of antitakeover statutes demonstrates. Id. at 1467-68; see also
Coffee, supra note 28, at 770-72 (discussing the impact of state antitakeover legislation);
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest Group Theory of Delaware
Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REv. 469, 471 (1987) (same).
72. Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 1494-95.
73. Roberta Romano conducted the leading event study showing that reincorporating
firms experience an increase in value or no significant stock price declines. See Romano,
Law as Product, supra note 43, at 279-80. Proponents of intervention respond with a
number of standard questions about the shareholder vote on which reincorporation is
conditioned. Even though Delaware has value-decreasing rules, the shareholders may
approve a move for several reasons: because the move on the whole increases shareholder
value, the shareholders have inadequate information, or management has tied the move
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draw on a contractual theory of the firm and point out that new
federally mandated fiduciary deterrents would retard the evolution of
contractual corporate arrangements;74 proponents respond that the
consensus view on contracting out continues to favor fiduciary
mandates in view of the rational apathy that impedes shareholder
choices of governance terms.75 Opponents argue that the federal
political landscape remains as hostile as that of the states, making
perverse effects a likely result of a federal law-reform movement;76
proponents respond that the federal venue is marginally more
hospitable and that centralized politics facilitate shareholder collective
action.
77
to another corporate action they desire. Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 1471. These problems
limit the normative force of the event studies: The stock prices may reflect the market's
reaction to the developments signalled by the reincorporation rather than the reincor-
poration itself, and managers may systematically choose to reincorporate at moments when
such information exists. Id. at 1449-50; see also Coffee, supra note 28, at 767-68 (offering
a critique of Romano's analysis); Macey & Miller, supra note 71, at 482 (same); Romano,
Law as Product, supra note 43, at 267 (discussing the implications of reincorporation).
Romano, who recognizes the former possibility, responds that it is improbable that
information tied to the move could swamp an otherwise negative stock price effect; rather,
if management were manipulating the process, price-negative rather than price-neutral
results should obtain for firms reincorporating for management-favorable purposes.
ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 18. Bebchuk, following others,
anticipates this point: Given convergence among the state codes, the absence of negative
returns may only mean that the legal rules of the original and destination state are equally
harmful. Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 1449; see also Coffee, supra note 28, at 767-68
(discussing the logical inferences to be derived from "statistical noise"); Melvin A.
Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1461, 1508 (1989);
Macey & Miller, supra note 71, at 482-83 (discussing the market signals produced by
relocation to Delaware). Furthermore, the fact that reincorporation does not decrease
value overall does not prove that competition produces desirable results on all corporate
issues. Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 1450.
Bebchuk, in sum, argues that the event studies must be seen in temporal perspective.
Id. at 1448-51. They do contradict Cary's picture of an ever-lowering race to the bottom
with Delaware in the lead. However, once we accept that point and join Romano on the
middle ground, the probative force of the studies diminishes. The race, in effect, bottomed
out before the studies were undertaken. Id. The prospective question is whether
intervention can cause the numbers to improve. Id. at 1509-10.
In Romano's view, acknowledging disproof of the race to the bottom decides the
debate over intervention. Given agreement on the beneficial effects of competition, she
said, the burden is on advocates of intervention to demonstrate "empirically which
particular code provisions harm shareholders and why national legislation would be more
likely to alleviate the problem." ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28,
at 19.
74. ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 90-91.
75. Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 1496-99.
76. ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 50, 75-84.
77. William W. Bratton, Corporate Law's Race to Nowhere in Particular, 44 U.
TORONTO L. J. 401, 432 (1994).
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B. Charter Competition as Regulatory Capture
This middle ground discussion of federal intervention takes on
the binary quality of the old race to the top/race to the bottom
discussion as its participants iterate positions from the historic debate
* over market and fiduciary deterrent strategies. However, as the
replay continues, each side has recognized possibilities for both
market success and market failure. This more open-ended theoretical
framework allows more flexibility in the diagnosis of the problem, and
the stronger assertions of regulatory competition theory have dropped
out of the picture for the most part. The 1980s antitakeover alliance
between the states and the managers has dispelled the notion that
identification of a market phenomenon at a significant stage in the
lawmaking process, taken alone, assures the ideal result of legislation
based solely on the exogenous preferences of individuals. It has
become clear that imbalanced interest group influence in this market-
driven lawmaking process prevents that result, divesting regulatory
competition theory of a legitimating effect.
Regulatory competition matches individual preferences and legal
results because actors have the opportunity to exit cheaply from an
unsatisfactory jurisdiction. The charter system, of course, does allow
for exit from an unsatisfactory jurisdiction, but, because the exit
privilege applies to firms rather than to shareholders, it does nothing
to ameliorate the agency problem. Corporate law has evolved under
charter competition to block shareholder access to the determination
of reincorporation decisions7 Existing market disciplines offer no
way around that barrier because they create no incentives to
encourage the development of a shareholder-favorable jurisdiction. 9
Successful control contests, whether by takeover or proxy fight,
displace one group of managers with another. The new management,
unless it has taken the firm private, remains in an agency relationship
with the firm's shareholders and thus has no reason to look for a
jurisdiction favorable to the shareholder interest.0 In addition, due
78. See infra notes 275-83 and accompanying text.
79. Cf. Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-
to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210,
1249 (1992) (arguing that the charter competition process is not defective in itself, but that
the unresolved principal-agent problem respecting the selection of the state of incor-
poration makes locational decisions defective).
80. The displacing group that plans to make further acquisitions with the target has
an interest in the removal of state law antitakeover barriers. However, reincorporation
to a hypothetical shareholder-favorable jurisdiction would not help with this problem, since
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to the peculiarities of America's constitutional structure, the com-
peting jurisdictions-which lack a balancing incentive-have national
lawmaking power over the shareholders of domiciliary corporations.
In this variant of regulatory competition, then, exit from one
jurisdiction provides no remedy for the dissatisfactions of the
disadvantaged interest group.
1. Capture Theories of Regulation
The mixed framework invites a retelling of the charter com-
petition story in terms of both the economic and governmental politics
of interest groups and organizations. In this story, charter com-
petition becomes the mainspring of a uniquely stable arrangement of
regulatory capture.
Under capture theories of regulation, interest groups and political
decisionmakers enter into jointly maximizing relationships. The
simple demand model of capture asserts that lawmaking follows the
lawmakers' responses to demand patterns."' Particular responses
depend on interactions between the lawmakers' risk proffles and the
projected benefits of legislative action.' The lawmaker, being risk
averse, tries to avoid conflicts-given no demand for legislation,
nothing is done; given organized demand, the lawmaker attempts to
satisfy the interest group making the demand with beneficial legis-
lation.' In addition, interest groups desiring to influence legislation
encounter collective action problems.' Different groups have
the law of the target jurisdiction applies in a takeover. The only solution to the acquiring
firm's problem, then, is interest group pressure to work against antitakeover legislation
nationwide. Yet, at this point, conflicting interests among acquiring firms enter into the
picture. Today's acquirer may be tomorrow's target; the managers of large acquirers can
afford to be patient and work around state barriers in making hostile acquisitions,
meanwhile enjoying the prerogatives of the state law regime.
81. See Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REv. 339,343-44
(1988); see also Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and
the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 265-68 (1982) (discussing the interest-group
theory).
82. Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON.
211, 214 (1976). Benefits can come in the form of resources or favorable consequences
for reelection. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON.
& MGMT. Sci. 3, 10-13 (1971). With corporate law, the benefit tends to be rents from
corporate business.
83. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence, 1983 Q.J. ECON. 371,394-96 (discussing the impact on the political redistribution
of income resulting from competition among political pressure groups vying for political
favors).
84. Olson's fundamental insight is that in a large, heterogeneous community,
individuals will prefer not to pay the full cost of the provision of nonexcludable public
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different abilities to overcome them-the smaller the group and the
higher the per capita stake of its members, the greater the likelihood
that the members will work out a collective arrangement and enjoy
the benefits of governmental influence." This activity results,
according to the theorists of the Virginia School, in a social loss from
rent-seeking. 6 Legislators create rents for the benefit of successful
interest groups, distributing them based on a self-seeking vote
calculus. 7
An additional body of capture theory supplements this demand
model with a supply-side story. Exclusively demand-based models of
law production tend to treat the political process as a black box and,
as a result, do not attempt to describe how legislative trades are
accomplished and enforced. 8 This is a problem, since legislative
goods and that, as a result, they will be undersupplied. A free-rider problem must be
overcome if public goods are to be supplied, and voluntary compliance can be secured only
by introducing selective incentives (such as fees) or sanctions. OLSON, supra note 48, at
50-51, 133-34. The result is that rational individuals are motivated to join interest groups
based on individualized selective incentives. Id. at 60-65. Given the free-rider problem,
large groups will have difficulty achieving their goals. ld. at 35-36.
85. It seems to follow that, in a case in which more than one interest group manages
to compete to achieve influence, the risk-averse legislator will delegate ultimate regulatory
authority to an agency. Once that occurs, the agency becomes the venue of interest group
activities. See JAMES WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 388-89 (1980).
86. The Virginia School concentrates on the economic theory of legislation. The idea
is simple: Government creates rent that is captured by interest groups. Politicians pass
legislation that benefits the interest groups that are better organized, and rents are
distributed based on the welfare maximization of the political decisionmakers. The cost
of supplying rents to well-organized groups is passed on to poorly organized groups.
The upshot is a waste of consumer surplus. Governments create rents and can
appropriate them, and they are likely to squander the rents they capture; as a result,
everyone is worse off. Under this view, the political process is justified only if lawmakers
produce legislation obtained without influence. The task of politics, then, is to create
legislation based on the exogenous preferences of individuals. See Richard S. Higgins et
al., Free Entry and Efficient Rent-Seeking, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RENT-SEEKING
127, 128 (Charles K. Rowley et al. eds., 1988); Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of
Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, in TOWARD A RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 39, 46-47 (James
Buchanan et al. eds., 1980).
87. Policies are evaluated in terms of the distribution of costs and benefits based on
the assumption of a level of votes for each dollar expended. See William C. Mitchell,
Interest Groups: Economic Perspectives and Contributions, 2 J. THEORETICAL POL. 85,98-
99 (1990); Tollison, supra note 81, at 339-50; Barry R. Weingast, The Congressional
Bureaucratic System; A Principal-Agent Perspective (With Applications to the SEC), 44
PuB. CHOICE 147, 147-48 (1984).
88. Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress;
or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132,
133 (1988); see also Tollison, supra note 81, at 347-66 (summarizing supply-side research).
Such models also leave unexplained such phenomena as simultaneous provision of policy
benefits to multiple diverse interests. See Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in
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trades, unlike well-drafted private contracts, can be undone at the
subsequent behest of a competing group. For example, an interest
group deal, obtained in the legislature through logrolling and other
trading mechanisms and then embodied in a legislative directive, can
be undercut later by an administrative agency responding to a
competing interest group. In the alternative, representatives can
amend or repeal a piece of legislation later at the request of a
competing group. Supply-side explanations of interest-group
dealmaking confront this problem of political insecurity by drawing on
organizational economics to show that institutional arrangements have
an impact on outcomes. This body of work disaggregates the
government into a complex of principal-agent relationships. 9 In
these stories, legislatures develop process and structure machinery to
control the opportunistic conduct of both career bureaucrats and
legislators." These devices include the legislative committee system,
which helps to overcome problems of asymmetric information
between legislative principals and bureaucratic agents through ex post
monitoring, and process requirements for rulemaking, which provide
advance notice of noncomplying conduct.9' The processes of the
Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORGS. 59, 65 (1992) (concluding that the special
interest model fails to explain environmental legislation).
89. Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political
Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORGS. 243, 243-44 (1987); Weingast, supra note 87, at 148.
90. Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Ad-
ministrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 441
(1989). A related, and more abstract, line of discourse considers the effects of given
modes of voting process on the ordering of preferences among elected representatives,
refuting the chaos scholars predicted under early social choice theory. See, eg., PETER C.
ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 266-301
(1986) (discussing agenda control and outcome); David P. Baron & John A. Ferejohn,
Bargaining in Legislatures, 83 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 1181,1189-98 (1989) (considering closed
and open rules of legislative amendment); Jules Coleman & John Ferejohn, Democracy
and Social Choice, 97 ETHICS 6,8-9 (1986) (finding that the particular content and contour
of institutions determines the extent to which electoral outcomes reflect popular
preferences).
91. For a formal agency model of information asymmetries and capture relationships
between legislatures and agencies, and between producer groups and public interest
groups, see JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN
PROCUREMENT AND REGULATION 480-500 (1993). But cf Andrei Shleifer & Robert W.
Vishny, Politicians and Firms (1994) (Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion
Paper No. 1686) (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors) (claiming that approach
turning on a complete information model is not plausible in cases where the problem of
inefficiency is essential to the politicians' performance, such as in state-run enterprises;
therefore, corruption is central to the operation of the firm).
For an application of this approach keyed to legal policymaking, see Jonathan R.
Macey, Organizational Design and the Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L.
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legislature also contribute to transactional stability: Legislative
procedures and committee jurisdictions give the congressional
gatekeeper the ability to resist short-term internal pressures.
92
2. Charter Competition as a Form of Capture
These capture theories of legislation and administration provide
a useful basis for explaining the success of the charter competition
system and the preeminence of Delaware. Exit through reincor-
poration provides a potent ex post enforcement device to the
managers who purchase legislation from the target state, particularly
a small state dependent on charter revenues. Ex ante, the code the
managers purchase provides them with control of the enforcing exit
decision by blocking shareholder access to the charter.93 The state's
incentive to collect rents from new incorporations assures that the
process legislation securing the exit route will not be amended in the
future to make exit more difficult. Thus the state's rent incentive
joins the deterrent of possible reincorporation to assure the managers
that the deal will stick. The combination does more than that,
however. It also mitigates any collective action problems the
managers might encounter in getting the future legislation. Should
desired legislation not be obtained, exit can be effected unilaterally,
and there will -remain up to forty-nine states from which to choose.
Furthermore, the chartering state's rent flow includes fees to
practicing lawyers in addition to franchise taxes. This assures an
identity of interests between management and key actors on the
supply side. In this scheme, the organized bar in the chartering state
can be expected to act as an effective advocate for the management
interest, without forcing management to organize a trade association
to enter into a formal lobbying relationship. Delaware practice
confirms this prediction.94 Delaware delegates to its bar association
ECON. & ORGS. 93, 99-103 (1992). Macey contends that legislators are able to capture
higher rents only if they can surmount the agency problem. Id. at 100. In Macey's view,
ex post monitoring and punishments may not be sufficient to solve the agency problem.
Ex ante structuring or "hard-wiring" of the agency works better, and the interest groups
that pay for the legislation can be expected to attempt to secure it. Id. at 100-03.
92. Kenneth A. ShepsIe, Congress is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 245 (1992). Moe, supra note 42, at 122-23,
criticizes this literature for its adherence to a model of motivation grounded in strategic
rationality, asserting that a thick description of the motivations of different types of actors
provides knowledge about authority that the principal-agent models do not offer.
93. See infra notes 259-74 and accompanying text.
94. It should be noted that the interests of the bar and management diverge on the
matter of litigation incentives. For discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 126-37.
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both agenda control and drafting responsibility for any amendments
to its corporate code. The bar and legislature have a long-standing
"understanding"-amendments to the corporations code must first be
drafted and approved by the bar association's corporate law section
and the bar association itself
95
Capture by charter competition exacerbates the shareholders'
collective action problem even as it reduces that of management.
State law not only blocks shareholder access to the charter, it provides
only management with routine compensation for expenses incurred in
voting contests.96 Meanwhile, the bar emerges as the only interest
group within the chartering state with an incentive to advance the
shareholders' interest in lawmaking processes. Litigating lawyers
promote shareholder welfare as an incident to making a living as
enforcers of the fiduciary deterrent. Unfortunately, this confluence
of interests results in a strictly limited set of shareholder benefits.
The lawyers have an incentive to promote lawmaking that strengthens
the market deterrent only if the change would lead to additional
litigable disputes. The same applies to lawmaking that enhances the
possibilities for shareholder-enforced self-regulation. Such incentives
seem unlikely to arise in practice. Fiduciary breaches that bring rents
to lawyers stem from excess management influence; any market or
self-regulatory governance strategy that has a cognizable chance of
working well in practice ultimately threatens to diminish those rents
by reducing the numbers of unproductive influence activities. In
addition, the bar's interest diverges from the shareholders' even
within the sphere of fiduciary enforcement, with the bar favoring a
95. See Andrew G.T. Moore II, State Competition: Panel Response, 8 CARDOZO L.
REV. 779, 780-81 (1987). Active drafting and discussion is limited largely to the corporate
law section. See Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History
and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 888-92 (1990). The section itself performs the
legislative function of sifting the comments of interested parties. Each of the three largest
corporate servicing firms have representatives to the section. Id. at 888-92, 910.
The legislature rubber stamps the bar's recommendations; the executive branch's role
is limited to representation at bar association meetings on invitation. Id. at 888-92; see also
David S. Schaffer, Jr., Delaware's Limit on Director Liability: How the Market for Incor-
poration Shapes Corporate Law, 10 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 665, 682-84 (1987)
(discussing the 1967 revision of Delaware corporate law).
96. It compensates only shareholder winners in board control contests and provides
no compensation at all to shareholders who oppose management positions in issue
contests. See Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y.
1955). For discussion, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for
Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1071 passim (1990).
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system that trades substantial money judgments to shareholders for
substantial attorneys' fees.'
In short, no interest group in the chartering state has a rent
incentive linked to the shareholders' interest in minimizing influence
costs within the firm. The shareholders, then, must self-organize"
to advance an agenda in state lawmaking processes. Unfortunately,
the charter competition system structurally limits prospects for payoffs
that would justify the costs of organization. Furthermore, any
sustained shareholder effort would have to be pursued in multiple
jurisdictions. By default, then, federal law emerges as the preferred
venue for organized shareholder efforts to alter legal structures to
make firms operate more effectively.9 Federal lawmakers, unlike
their counterparts in the states, have not been captured by the
management side pursuant to a deal with sticking power. This is, of
course, only a negative qualification that by no means implies
probable success for a shareholder influence campaign. Process costs
still loom large at the federal level, and management retains both
organizational advantages and well-worn paths of influence. But the
turf at least is open. There are no rent incentives tied to chartering
decisions, and a large number of players, each making complex and
political calculations in a dynamic environment, makes it easier to
contest management influence.10
C. Conflicting Demands on the Captured State
We draw no race to the bottom conclusions from this capture
model of corporate lawmaking. Rather, the model serves to explicate
the theoretical implications of the middle ground framework, putting
a different gloss on the same practices purveyed as productive
relational contracting in the race to the top story. Since many areas
97. For discussion of the role that the lawyers' interest plays in shaping Delaware law,
see infra text accompanying notes 131-37.
98. Shareholders also may rely on independent allies such as academics.
99. This conclusion obtains even though Delaware's compact and relatively informal
lawmaking processes, see supra note 95 and accompanying text, hold out significant process
cost advantages. For a discussion of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the
federal venue, compare ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 75-81,
with Bratton, supra note 77, at 430-33.
100. The SEC embodies this possibility: Historically, its actors tend to satisfy the
demands of neither the shareholder nor the management side. In addition, they bring an
inherited, albeit limited ideology of shareholder protection to their ongoing mediative
activities. Recent amendments to the proxy rules promulgated at the instance of
institutional shareholder activists, see infra note 180, concretely demonstrate this agency's
continuing receptiveness to shareholder agenda items.
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of state corporate law find shareholder and management interests in
alignment, it complicates, but does not displace, the relational contract
reading.
The capture model does suggest exploration of strategies of
federal intervention designed to diminish state law's imbalanced
supply-side incentives and imbalanced opportunities to make
demands. However, it does not thereby imply that federal fiduciary
standards are the most desirable mode of intervention. Federal
fiduciary standards would ameliorate both the supply and demand-
side problems by imposing shareholder-favorable norms. They also
would entail a difficult trade off, because process infirmities could
follow from the appointment of the federal judicial system to the
shareholder guardian role. The infirmities lie in the possibility that
a preemptive change in the venue of corporate common lawmaking
from the Delaware courts to the federal courts would so materially
alter the composition of the product sold in the charter market as to
denude Delaware of significant relational capital. The loss of the
first-mover role in common lawmaking would leave Delaware
marketing a product of diminished value and weaken its relational tie
with firms. The rents that support Delaware as a tenter of infor-
mation on corporate governance disputes could dissipate, possibly
leading to corporate lawmaking on a level of diminished sophis-
tication.
Thus, one assertion of regulatory competition theory-that
national lawmaking procedures carry process infirmities that are
avoided when the subject matter is left to the competing
states-continues to bear on the debate. The captured state system
can enhance economic welfare to the extent that its competitive
element causes the lawmaker to weigh the regulations' benefit and
harm to the firm as a whole.'' Arguably, then, the preferred
solution to the corporate agency problem leaves the subject matter
with the states but finds a means to interpose the shareholder interest
101. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 13, at 63-66 (providing a prisoners'
dilemma model of agency capture).
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into state lawmakers' demand picture."° This would render the
capture benign.a(
Past practice provides a base point from which to begin this
reordering of incentives. Shareholder demands have, in fact, figured
into the existing competitive regime in a secondary posture, influen-
cing the shape of Delaware's fiduciary case law. This result appears
surprising if we view state law under the pure product competition
model. To account for it, the model must be expanded to encompass
the political instability that results from the national attention that
Delaware lawmaking attracts because of its dominant market position.
1. Delaware Lawmaking and the Threat of Federal Intervention
The deal struck between the chartering state and management
can never be entirely secure because the possibility of removal of
corporate lawmaking to the federal level inheres in the constitutional
structure of the United States. Delaware, as the entity most
dependent on corporate law revenues, is the contracting state most
prone to view that possibility as a threat. This structural constant
suggests that Delaware lawmakers may have secondary incentives to
respond to shareholder interests." 4
It can be plausibly hypothesized that Delaware actors remain
averse to possible destructive exercises of federal preemptive power
and have incentives to avoid exciting its application. 5 Federal law
102. This point can be expanded by analogy to the literature on legislative control of
agencies, under which the question of political control has been addressed in terms of the
economic principal-agent problem. See generally, e.g., McCubbins et al., supra note 89.
A federally imposed fiduciary regime would restrict opportunities for this beneficial
engagement because it would remove the lawmaker from an immediate agency relationship
with the firm.
103. Restating this point, the charter competition problem stems from the same
incentive problems and barriers to collective action that create the corporate agency
problem in the first place.
104. A number of commentators have recognized this possibility. See Bebchuk, supra
note 36, at 1455; Cary, supra note 10, at 688; Eisenberg, supra note 73, at 1512.
105. This dual demand model's plausibility depends on three assumptions. First, actors
in Delaware must perceive that their activities have the potential to excite political action
at the national level. Second, Delaware actors must perceive that the shareholder interest
finds a voice among the actors and groups that influence federal law. Third, the projected
federal political action must have a negative impact either on the charter competition
system as a whole or on the relative place of Delaware in the system to reduce Delaware's
rent flow.
As to the first assumption, periodic calls for federal intervention have, over the years,
given Delaware reasons for concern. Although federal intervention has not been a present
prospect since the late 1970s, see infra note 114, the subject has remained a staple of
corporate law discourse. Anecdotal evidence shows that Delaware lawmakers keep it in
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reform discussions of the past two decades have given Delaware
actors cause for concern because the often-proposed remedy of
federal fiduciary standards would have an adverse impact on their
interests. This vulnerability stems from the competitive evolution of
corporate statutory law. Competition has caused state corporate
codes to converge in their broad outlines. As a result, Delaware's
case law, judges, and speedy process figure prominently in its line of
legal products."° Federal intervention might deprive Delaware of
mind when they take politically sensitive steps. The Delaware bar's concern about federal
responses is confirmed in accounts of its deliberations on new legislation. When the bar
first considered (and rejected) an antitakeover statute, it received comment letters from
Martin Lipton and Joseph Flom warning that enactment might excite federal intervention.
Such worries were expressed at the committee meeting on the proposal. See Alva, supra
note 95, at 906-08.
The second assumption has been the subject of debate. Professor Romano argues that
management replicates its dominant influence in the states at the federal level. She
inspected the federal corporate law reform politics of the 1980s to show that management
voices were heard the most often. Romano surveyed the content of both federal takeover
legislation proposed during the period 1969-87 and of interest group representation in the
accompanying legislative processes. She found that the overwhelming majority of bills had
an antibidder aspect and that management voices appeared much more frequently than
shareholder or labor voices. ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at
76-81. Romano also showed, however, that bureaucratic, political, and academic voices
were heard in quantity during the 1980s. l at 77. In any event, to the extent that large
stakes in the status quo make Delaware's lawmakers risk averse, any active federal politics
with possible adverse consequences might prompt them to make a preemptive response.
Regarding the third assumption, the gravity of a federal threat will vary with the
particular form of federal intervention proposed. A discrete provision might impair
Delaware's position only incidentally, blocking a particular management accommodation,
but applying the block to all 50 states. As examples, consider (1) the all holders rule, Rule
14d-10 under section 14(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-10
(1994), providing that any tender offer must be open to all holders of the subject class of
securities, preempting the defensive tactic sustained in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); and (2) the special tax on greenmail profits, I.R.C. § 5881
(1991), enacted in 1987, which imposes a 50% excise tax on profit realized in a greenmail
transaction. In either case, Delaware no longer can take a competitive lead on the subject
matter regulated, but neither can any other state. The overall field of subject matter for
competition shrinks slightly, but not enough cognizably to impair Delaware's position.
Furthermore, a federal provision might even result in a short-term enhancement of
Delaware's position. Consider, as an example, the proposals for national antitakeover
legislation made during the mid-1980s. At that time, worries about federal responses
contributed to Delaware's hesitancy to initiate takeover defense legislation. Federal
intervention on either side would have settled the matter, removing a threat of competition
from other states.
106. In addition to a large collection of past decisions, Delaware sells a unique,
technically qualified judiciary and speedy determination of new disputes. Bayless Manning
identified Delaware's judiciary as its prime attraction, comparing Delaware to the medieval
law merchant. Bayless Manning, State Competition: Panel Response, 8 CARDOZO L. REV.
779,784-85 (1987). For confirmation of this point from a game theory perspective, see Ian
Ayres, Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and Fischel, 59
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the principal justification for its premium price, resulLag in an
outbreak of price competition in the market and the erosion of
Delaware's position as an informational center. Recognition of a
perceived federal threat implies a model in which Delaware faces
conflicting demands, each threatening potential negative consequen-
ces. First, the management interest must be satisfied to prevent
corporate migration out of the state and entry into competition by
competing states. Second, federal actors, as proxies for the
shareholders, must be satisfied to avoid destructive intervention. The
conflicting demands complicate the business of response: Professor
Eisenberg has suggested that the conflict leaves Delaware with an
incentive to avoid taking the lead in adopting rules favoring managers
at the shareholders' expense. Other states have a different incentive.
If they offer innovative management-side payments, they may siphon
business from Delaware; if the federal government intervenes to stop
them, they lose little. So long as a given state has a small market
share, its actions attract little attention. Delaware, in contrast, cannot
take any significant steps without close scrutiny nationwide. 7 It
remains under pressure to follow new developments elsewhere, but
emerges in a mediative role.
A question arises as to how Delaware, alone in this competing
demand situation, can structure a mediative response without losing
business, given a market still keyed to management preferences.08
Two factors make this picture plausible. First, no full-service
alternative domicile exists, and only a handful of other jurisdictions
have strong incentives to incur the start-up costs to market a full-
service operation. But a potential competitor has no assurance that
a third jurisdiction will not duplicate its efforts,"° and given the low
U. CHI. L. REv. 1391,1414-15 (1992) (reviewing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCrURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991)).
107. Eisenberg, supra note 73, at 1512-13; see also Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 1455
(pointing out that there remains a range within which states can maneuver without fear
of federal intervention).
108. Delaware's mediative output can be explained in terms of the interests of
managers as a group. Well-timed interventions to protect shareholders serve to defuse the
federal threat and to make Delaware a buffer state that protects corporations from federal
intervention. However, the benefits of a mediative jurisprudence are more questionable
from the point of view of individual managers seeking an optimal environment. They have
an apparent incentive to cause their firms to migrate to states adopting less equivocal
antitakeover policies, free riding on the firms that stay. Of course, if a large number of
firms surmounted this collective action barrier and successfully shopped for a more
responsive jurisdiction, federal intervention would become more likely. The same might
occur if a large number of firms left Delaware, starting a new race to the bottom.
109. See Daniels, supra note 52, at 182.
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cost of reincorporation,"' no assurance that its new customers will
remain. Second, the shareholders' newly discovered capability of self-
protective collective action may effectively deter management
reincorporation proposals. Beginning in the late 1980s, incidents of
shareholder resistance caused managers to drop the assumption of
automatic shareholder approval of antitakeover proposals requiring
charter amendment."' Thus, departure from Delaware may not be
the open option it used to be.
Evidence of the dual demand model's robustness can be found
in the recent pattern of Delaware lawmaking. Given statutory
convergence among the states and the dominance of the management
interest, the problems of conflicting demand rarely show up in
corporate legislative process. Antitakeover legislation is the principal
recent instance, and Delaware's corporate bar moved late and with
caution in putting an antitakeover statute before its legislature."'
The conflict becomes more apparent in the adjudication of fiduciary
cases, particularly those dealing with corporate control transfers.
'l
Here the shareholder interest has found Delaware intermittently
responsive. The Delaware judiciary abruptly changed a long-standing
habit of monolithic fidelity to management interests in 1977," and
110. See Black, supra note 28, at 551, 574, 586-90.
111. See infra notes 162-80 and accompanying text. Romano contributed some evidence
of this phenomenon with a report on the behavior of public corporations subject to the
1990 Pennsylvania takeover statute. The Pennsylvania statute, like most takeover statutes,
included a default rule that applied the statute to all corporations that failed to take
affirmative action to opt out. See PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2571-75 (1994). Despite this,
pressure from institutional investors resulted in opting out by the boards of 127 firms; only
72 firms stayed in. ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 68-69.
Presumably, opportunistic reincorporation proposals would excite similar shareholder
attention.
112. See Alva, supra note 95, at 906-08.
113. This is analogous to the allocation of responsibility between legislatures and
agencies. Legislators faced with a conflicting demand problem can avoid confrontation
with the competing interest groups and resort to the expedient of delegating lawmaking
authority to an agency; with state corporate law, the judiciary tends to assume this
function. Delaware, as it responded to sensitive developments in the corporate control
market of the 1980s, kept open its options by employing equivocal judicial rules in
preference to clear cut legislation.
114. See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976-80 (Del. 1977) (imposing strict
fiduciary standards on parent firms in cash-out mergers). The Singer rule was in turn
rejected for a looser, process-based approach in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,
704, 715 (Del. 1983). Oddly, Singer was decided after the immediate threat of federal
preemption of state fiduciary rules under the antifraud rules of the securities laws had
been removed by the Supreme Court in Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479-80
(1977). The story told at the time was that the brush with preemption at the hands of the
federal judiciary and the wider critical atmosphere provoked by Cary and others had
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Cary's 1975 article has been accorded a role in the break. 5 The
federal threat, thus crystallized, impressed upon the Delaware courts
the practical importance of solicitude to shareholder interests."
6
This post-Cary behavior pattern has persisted and still yields headlines
as highly publicized cases articulate surprising new shareholder-
protective applications of basic fiduciary rules."7 The pattern has
been volatile,"' however, and shareholder protective intervention
has not been a constant theme. The Delaware courts' indulgence in
this back-and-forth at apparent cost to a reputation for certainty,
predictability, and management responsiveness confirms the presence
of competing demands.
TWo caveats must be noted. First, the federal threat does not
play an exclusive causative role in this conflicting demand model.
Courts and judges sell reputations for speed, dependability, and
predictability, but they also stake reputational capital in their working
prompted the Delaware Supreme Court to reverse its direction and become more
accommodating to the interests of investors to diminish the threat of intervention.
115. The federal threat, and Cary's association with it, appears in accounts of these
events. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 28, at 764-66; Eisenberg, supra note 73, at 1511-13.
116. Prior to Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), there was a cognizable
chance that much conduct covered by state fiduciary law would be found to be
"manipulative" or "fraudulent" conduct violative of section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 10b-5 thereunder. The antimanagerial political climate of
the time also resulted in the introduction of preemptive legislation in Congress. See S.
2567, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
117. See Paramount Comms., Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34,46-48 (Del. 1993)
(holding that management has an obligation to achieve the best value reasonably available
for shareholders); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 366-71 (Del. 1993)
(applying a heightened duty of care scrutiny of boardroom merger decision and suggesting
an expanded remedial concept inclusive of post-merger gain); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (inventing a duty of management
that changed from defending against a tender offer to auctioning the company in limited
circumstances); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985)
(applying an expanded review of tender offer defensive tactics under a proportionality
test); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873-81 (Del. 1985) (suddenly expanding the
duty of care to cover board approval of arm's length merger).
118. Equally famous cases often appear to restrict the application of the new rules. See
Paramount Comms., Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150-54 (Del. 1989) (limiting
application of Unocal and Revlon); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356-57
(Del. 1985) (sustaining "poison pill defense" under Unocal); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701, 703-04 (Del. 1983) (overruling Singer in favor of a less restrictive process
scrutiny of cash-out mergers).
The legislature, prompted by the corporate committee of the Delaware state bar,
entered in on management's side in one famous instance. After Smith v. Van Gorkom's
application of the duty of care caused nervousness in boardrooms and a substantial
increase in insurance premiums, the legislature amended the code to permit firms to opt
out of the duty of care by charter amendment. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)
(1991) (permitting opting out of personal liability of directors for duty of care violations).
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roles. This gives the judges an independent incentive to protect the
legitimacy of the system" 9 by balancing the satisfaction of interest
group demands with public-regarding results. Delaware judges,
responding to Cary's well-publicized allegations of corruption,"
have declared a commitment to this role integrity.' They describe
themselves as mediators between management and
shareholders-protectors of market risk-taking who nevertheless
impose ethical constraints.'
Second, the identification of competing demands should not be
taken to predict a pattern of even-handed mediation. Although the
federal threat holds out the potential of substantial injury, it remains
an unlikely event. Potential impairment of competitive position and
loss of incorporations is a more immediate problem for Delaware, and
also amounts to a competing reputational concern for Delaware
judges, given limitations on their tenure." If we look at the pattern
the Delaware courts took during the 1980s in charting a course
between competing demands on sensitive corporate control matters,
we can infer that the Delaware courts took advantage of an infor-
mational slack 24 to develop a body of case law that gave an ap-
119. See Eric Rasmusen, Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game, 10 J.L. ECON. &
ORGS. 63, 72-74, 78-80 (1994) (offering a repeat-game model of judicial motivation with
infinite time horizons). As occurs with repeat games, the model results in a multiplicity
of equilibria in which the outcome depends on the players' expectations. Id. at 74. In
Rasmussen's model, judges follow precedent if there is a self-enforcing system based less
on compulsion than on the need to uphold systemic legitimacy. Id. at 72-74. In the case
of Delaware, of course, systemic legitimacy has pointed in the opposite direction. See also
Thomas J. Miceli & Metin M. Cosgel, Reputation and Judicial Decision-making, 23 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 31, 42-49 (1994) (modelling the preferences of judges on a utility
function that includes both a private and a reputational component, with the decision as
to whether to follow precedent turning on a trade-off between the two components, and
the equilibrium rate of adherence to precedent depending on the distribution of
preferences across the population).
120. Cary, supra note 10, at 684, 696-98.
121. See Coffee, supra note 28, at 764-65.
122. See Moore, supra note 95, at 779-800 (written while Moore was a Delaware
Supreme Court Justice). They also have acknowledged the federal threat. See William
T. Quillen, The Federal-State Corporate Law Relationship-A Response to Professor
Seligman's Call for Federal Preemption of State Corporate Fiduciary Law, 59 BROOK. L.
REv. 107, 129 (1993) (author is former Delaware Chancellor and Supreme Court Justice).
123. The recent refusal of Delaware's judicial nominations committee to recommend
the reappointment of Justice Andrew Moore, a judge with a reputation for solicitude for
the shareholder interest, arguably confirms this point. See Richard B. Schmitt, Delaware
Judge Is Seen as Investors' Friend, WALL ST. J., July 7, 1994, at B2.
124. Slack results from monitoring costs that prevent interested parties from observing
all actions taken by a regulator. To the extent slack is present, a regulator is more likely
to be captured by an interest group; a self-interested regulator pursues public regarding
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pearance of greater weight to shareholder interests than was justified
by the actual payoffs. In highly publicized cases, the Delaware courts
announced vague standards that held out the prospect of enhancing
shareholder value. But in the less well-publicized cases that followed,
they took the opportunity held out by complex facts to refrain from
applying the standards in management-constraining ways.21z The
full set of results tallied by the lawyers who make reincorporation
decisions signalled considerably more room for management
maneuver than did the public profile signalled by the leading cases.
2. The Litigation Anomaly
Full description of the complex of incentives that shape Delaware
law requires further consideration of conflicting interests on the
supply side. We have already suggested that managers implicitly rely
on the Delaware bar to represent their interests in the state.
However, the bar's interests are far from perfectly aligned with
management's, since litigation against managers also provides a source
of income. Delaware has a unique collection of process rules that
advance this local interest. These encourage derivative litigation,
12 6
making sure that the local bar gets a share of the action by requiring
Delaware lawyers to make appearances and flings." Competing
demands also result in some systemic concessions to managers,
12
8
but the concessions hardly counter Delaware's reputation as a fee-
generating center for corporate lawyers. The litigation rules thus
stand as the great anomaly in the charter competition discussion,
policies only when little or no slack is present. See Levine & Forrence, supra note 47, at
183.
125. For a reading of the post-Unocal cases along these lines, see VICTOR BRUDNEY
& WILLIAM W. BRATTON, BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATE FINANCE 1087-95, 1129-30 (4th ed. 1993).
126. Delaware differs from many jurisdictions in not requiring plaintiffs in shareholder
derivative actions to post security for expenses. See DEL. CT. C.P.R. 23.1. Delaware
facilitates service of process on nonresident directors with a broad consent to service
statute. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (1993). It also is liberal in its fee awards to
derivative plaintiffs' lawyers: Under its nonpecuniary settlement practice, defending
managers can trade a high fee for a small overall recovery. Coffee, supra note 28, at 763.
127. See DEL. SUP. CT. R. 12(a) (1); DEL. CH. CT. R. 170.
128. Delaware ameliorates the litigation rules' immediate impact on managers by
allowing for liberal indemnification. Its courts also have been inventive in recent years in
placing procedural barriers in the way of a trial on the merits of derivative claims. See
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A2d 805,813-14 (Del. 1984); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A,2d
779, 781-86 (Del. 1981). For criticism of these and subsequent cases, see Seligman, New




synchronizing with neither the race to the top'29 nor the race to the
bottom."
Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller have explained the
litigation rules with a supply-side account that highlights the impact
of internal interest group politics on the production of Delaware
law.' In their account, all groups within the state have a common
interest in producing a marketable legal regime, but the groups differ
on the relative proportions of costs imposed and revenues earned.
The taxpayers have an interest in higher direct costs (franchise tax
revenues) and lower indirect costs (legal fees). The lawyers' interest
in fees would be served by lower direct costs leading to a greater
number of incorporations, and by higher indirect legal costs even
sacrificing some incorporations when the legal fees paid exceed those
lost. Macey and Miller assert that, unlike Delaware, a state acting as
a pure profit maximizer would limit indirect costs to maximize direct
costs.3 2 Delaware fails to conform to the product model's predictions
because the bar acts as a small, cohesive interest group that extracts
special concessions from the legislature at the expense of the general
public.
33
Macey and Miller rightly emphasize the organized bar's political
power. Yet two factors that align the interests of the bar with those
of the rest of the state need to be added to their description. First,
the federal threat may temper the incentive of Delaware's lawyers to
lobby for a reduction in direct charges to customers. Increasing
Delaware's market share substantially above the level of one-half of
public incorporations"3 would make Delaware even more of a
"national" lawmaking center, enhancing its visibility and vulnerability
129. Cary, who favored strict fiduciary-law control of management conduct, explained
the rules as a special exception keyed to the interests of the Delaware bar. Cary, supra
note 10, at 687.
130. Since the rules expand the zone of legal control of corporate actors for the benefit
of lawyers, they arguably derogate from shareholder interests, viewed from the market
deterrent point of view. See Macey & Miller, supra note 71, at 510-11.
131. Id. at 472.
132. Id. at 498, 502-04.
133. Id. at 506-09. Macey and Miller add an asymmetric information component to this
market imperfection story. They draw on Romano's finding that lawyers (and to a lesser
extent investment bankers) play key roles in reincorporation decisions and favor Delaware.
Id. at 486-87 (citing Romano, Law as Product, supra note 43, at 273,275 n.72). They note
* that information problems on the clients' part may present a barrier to competition among
the lawyers. Id. If the clients have an information problem, then we can account for
Delaware's litigation rules as a shrewd marketing move-a boon to those responsible for
making reincorporation decisions. Id. at 487.
134. See supra note 43.
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to challenge at the national level. Given a state with a monopoly
position, traditional federalism objections to intervention carry less
weight. Second, rules that encourage litigation in Delaware play a
secondary role in production. Delaware's case law and judges figure
prominently in its substantive law product line.3' Its code's ad-
vantages are less distinct than those of its cases, given statutory
convergence among the states, but Delaware does not completely
control the production of case law. The first option on the choice of
the forum for new disputes tends to lie with the plaintiff, and in many
instances Delaware law questions can be litigated in other states or in
federal courts. This gives Delaware a reason to offer incentives to
plaintiffs. Their cooperation gives Delaware the opportunity to apply
its own law, preserving the first-mover advantage and generating a
flow of cases. These, in turn, are products sold in the charter market.
The need to satisfy the demands of the national plaintiff's bar
reinforces the internal bargaining position of Delaware's bar, further
explaining the state's delegation to the bar of the corporate legislative
function.'36 However, the delegation to the bar also helps to
stabilize the capture arrangement with management. 37
D. From Threatened Federal Intervention to Shareholder
Intervention-The Strategy of Countervailing Interest Empower-
ment
The foregoing survey of the charter competition system
highlights three points. First, although the system can be described
as one of voluntary exchanges, that description does not by itself
justify the system because these exchanges entail the capture of public
authority. The states here effectively sell the coercive exercise of
their authority on behalf of a purchasing group.'38 The system
thereby lacks not only the exit possibilities presupposed by regulatory
competition theory, but also the exit possibilities present when actors
freely make contracts. Although the system affords relational
benefits, it also channels distributions within the firms that enter into
contracts with the states, making losers of the principals and winners
of the agents. Second, the relative stability of the charter market
cannot be completely accounted for with a relational contract model
135. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
137. Thus, it may be that the conflict between Delaware's taxpayers and attorneys is
either more nascent than actual or more settled than active.
138. See Moe, supra note 42, at 123.
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that recognizes only one possible route of defection by the
state-defection to anticorporate interests opposed to the interests of
both shareholders and managers. Contracts in the charter market are
also structured to guard against state defection to the shareholder
interest. In addition, in a federal system, state public authority, once
captured, can be recaptured by a competing interest that manages to
invoke federal authority.'39 Potential federal intervention makes
this recapture a constant possibility in corporate law. Third, federal-
state political instability can have wealth-enhancing properties. Under
the conflicting demand model of Delaware law, the federal threat
reinforces the shareholder voice, moving Delaware in the direction of
shareholder value enhancement. The stronger the threat, the more
pronounced the move.
Taken alone, however, the federal threat does not provide a
workable basis for solving the corporate agency problem. Substantial
political barriers to shareholder capture of federal authority keep the
threat distant and make it possible for Delaware to defuse it with
minimal concessions to the shareholders, while providing management
with maximum feasible protection of its own prerogatives. Nor does
this threat lend itself to institutionalization as a component of a
federal intervention strategy designed to intensify the conflicting
demands on the states. Institutionalization implies the congressional
mandate of a prospective and graduated scheme that ripens into
preemptive mandates only to the extent that some background
normative standard remains unsatisfied."4' Such a carrot-and-stick
approach also implies a fully articulated federal corporate law policy.
It is hard to imagine how such a scheme, once implemented on a
national basis, would amount to anything short of blanket preemption
that sacrifices the relational benefits of the state system.
Federal intervention nonetheless could help to place a stronger
quantum of shareholder demand before state lawmakers. In
regulatory theory, one expedient for the problem of agency capture
by a producer group is consumer empowerment through the grant of
standing in regulatory processes to public interest groups. 4' This
139. See id. at 124.
140. Under this "big stick" theory of regulation, the regulatory authority makes self-
regulation generally available, but holds out a graduated threat of command and control
regulation and punishment for uncooperative parties, thereby building in an incentive to
comply. See AYREs & BRArrHWAITE, supra note 13, at 39-40 (discussing the theory in the
administrative law context).
141. In Ayres and Braithwaite's model of "tripartitism," the public interest group
receives the same information as the regulator, a seat at the negotiating table, and equal
1995] 1901
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tripartite 42 strategy follows from the insight that the structuring of
conflicts between agents, including third parties, can assist in the
collection of information and the reordering of incentives in a desired
direction. 3  Empowerment brings the representatives of the
countervailing interest inside the system. Once inside, they assist
legislative principals in overcoming the problem of asymmetric
information in agency control. The countervailing interest generates
information about the agency, supplementing the costily process of
direct supervision.'" Empowerment also reorders the incentives of
the agents of the countervailing interest. Their inside position holds
out an incentive to abandon obstructionist strategies and develop
cooperative relationships with both regulators and producers. Ideally,
they assist the evolution of win-win outcomes in the ongoing
regulatory bargaining game. 45 Finally, since these public interest
figures attain their status as agents in the world of grassroots politics,
they are relatively unsusceptible to capture. Since their guardianship
positions are contestable, reputational incentives make defection to
competing interests unlikely."4
The strategy of countervailing interest empowerment shares
objectives with the strategy of regulatory competition. Both seek
regulatory flexibility and balanced control of regulatory structures that
deter the capture of regulators.47 The choice between the two may
depend in part on the situation. Regulatory competition theory
assumes that competition provoked by exit frees the regulator from
interest group control. Interest group empowerment addresses the
capture problem where competition either has been blocked by
regulatory coordination, or, as has occurred in the case of corporate
law, has served as a mechanism to enforce the capture arrangement.
standing. AYRES & BRAITHWArrE, supra note 13, at 57-58.
142. "Tripartite" is used id. at 57-60.
143. LAFFONT & TIROLE, supra note 91, at 611.
144. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Police Patrols v. Fire Alarms, 28 AM.
J. POL. SI. 165, 166 (1984), distinguished between "police patrol" oversight, direct
monitoring of the agent by the principal, and "fire alarm" protection, a passive form of
oversight in which third parties bear the bulk of the cost of providing information. This
model was extended in Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Learning from Oversight:
Fire Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORGS. 96,105 (1994), with
a model of a multistage, single-shot two-person game involving a principal and an agent,
showing how the principal learns from fire-alarm oversight.
145. AYRES & BRArrHWAITE, supra note 13, at 71-73.
146. Id. at 73.
147. See id. at 59, 71.
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The often-suggested corporate law reform that we revive
here-shareholder initiative to amend the charter and effect reincor-
poration-is the corporate law equivalent of an interest group
empowerment strategy. The avenue of shareholder initiative makes
it possible for the shareholders to make competing demands on the
states themselves, and thereby gain a seat at the table when state laws
are formulated. The problem with- this strategy, of course, is the
problem of shareholder collective action. However, as* the next part
shows, the gravity of that problem has diminished.
III. STRATEGIES FOR ENFORCED SELF-REGULATION THROUGH
SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION
Concentrated institutional ownership holds out the possibility that
shareholders can surmount collective action barriers keeping them
from governance participation. Shareholder participation, in turn,
holds out the possibility of a transition from voluntary to enforced
self-regulation as shareholders use their votes to revise the process
terms of corporate contracts or to place capable and independent
monitors on the board. Enforced self-regulation, in turn, holds out
the possibility of cooperative gain through relational engagement.
The short-term, arm's length engagement of the shareholder under a
deterrent regime evolves into the long-term, patient commitment of
an equity partner."4 In theory, this resolves governance conflicts of
the 1980s: Effective monitoring reduces the gap between market and
intrinsic value that triggers hostile intervention by market means.' 49
This relational model's realization depends in part on the
alignment between governance benefits and the incentives of
institutional agents. This part describes these incentive problems and
identifies the strategies for their solution. In theory, financial benefits
themselves provide sufficient incentives, given the removal of legal
barriers to group action. In practice, shareholder intervention has
been effected by a group of political entrepreneurs, the agents of
public pension funds, who appear to be pursuing reputational gain.
148. See Ayres & Cramton, supra note 19, at 1038; Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as
Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 124, 129
(1994) [hereinafter Gordon, Cumulative Voting].
149. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraaknan, Investment Companies as Guardian
Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in the Corporate Governance Debate, 45 STAN. L.
REv. 985, 1006-09 (1993) [hereinafter Gilson & Kraakman, Investment Companies].
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A. The Collective Action Problem, the Cost-Benefit Solution, and the
Counter Story
Historically, shareholders of public companies are an Olsonian
latent group.'"° That is, a collective good-active monitoring of
management-would make them better off given proportionate
distribution of its costs, but the law provides no cost-sharing
mechanism, and the free-rider problem prevents the emergence of a
volunteer or group of volunteers with an incentive to provide the
good."' Given dispersed shareholdings, the nontrivial costs of
active monitoring, and the alternative of exit through sale, the
benefits obtainable without investment in monitoring exceed the
benefits obtainable from investment." In addition, rational apathy
prevails when the system mandates that matters be presented for
shareholder approval. The rational small shareholder does not invest
in information about governance matters, given the likelihood that the
collective action problem inhibits an effective group response."5 3
Collective action theory allows for the possibility that a subgroup
of a latent group will organize and provide the public good if the
benefits from action to each member of the subgroup exceed the costs
incurred."M The increased concentration of shareholdings in
institutional hands makes it conceivable that institutional subgroups
might find investment in monitoring cost beneficial. 55  Con-
centration of shares also promises to mitigate the rational apathy
problem. The shareholders' decision of whether to seek information
about the governance issue depends on the costs and expected
benefits of the effort and the initiative's probabilities of success. The
cost is independent of the number of shares held. With individual
shareholders holding larger proportionate stakes in the firm, the
150. See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 455-59 (1991) [hereinafter Rock, Shareholder
Activism] (working the models of Olson and Hardin through the corporate fact pattern).
151. Each member of the group rationally prefers that others in the group incur the
costs of providing the public good.
152. Rock, Shareholder Activism, supra note 150, at 455-56.
153. See Grundfest, supra note 32, at 910.
154. Rock, Shareholder Activism, supra note 150, at 457-59 (citing RUSSELL HARDIN,
COLLECIVE ACON 41 (1982)).
155. Id. at 459. As Black argues, shareholder passivity may be historically contingent,
the result of a combination of legal obstacles and past dispersed ownership patterns. See
Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520, 525 (1990)
[hereinafter Black, Shareholder Passivity].
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expected returns from a given information investment go up, as does
the proponent's chance of success.
156
Subgroup formation depends on the size of the group, the cost of
action, and the magnitude of the benefit the subgroup seeks.
Proponents of law reform designed to facilitate shareholder par-
ticipation direct most of their attention to the first two factors. Since
the number of members needed to form a subgroup declines as
ownership concentration goes up, the proponents argue for a
relaxation of the regulatory barriers that impede the accumulation of
large holdings in given firms by single investors or organized groups
of investors. The proponents also circulate blueprints for cheap
strategies, since, as the costs of a given initiative go down, subgroup
formation can go forward with a lower level of concentration and a
lower projected probability of success.
158
In sum, the proponents assert that, given certain legal ad-
justments, prospects for financial gain by themselves will induce
governance initiatives by institutional investors. Yet there is a
counter story. This asserts that, even with legal adjustments,
governance initiatives realizing the full promise of cooperative gain
through enforced self-regulation cannot be expected. Two points are
emphasized. First, agency relationships within investment institutions
create disincentives that prevent subgroup formation, even assuming
a projection of a positive return to the subgroup from an investment
in governance. Since the individual manager's performance is
measured against the performance of the market as a whole and
subgroup investment benefits the market as a whole, successful
governance investments do not necessarily improve the individual
manager's performance profile.5 9 Second, the benefits of cost-
intensive relational investment remain underspecified. In theory,
156. According to Black, the incentive to become informed increases as the holder's
share ownership level is squared. Id. at 585-89.
157. Id. at 578.
158. See Grundfest, supra note 32, at 908-13 (examining the minimum cost strategy of
the "just vote no" campaign). Proponents of reform also stress that scale economies lie
in the application of a single governance device to multiple companies, Black, Shareholder
Passivity, supra note 155, at 584, and argue for rules that transfer the cost of shareholder
initiatives to the firm, see id. at 579-80.
159. Rock, Shareholder Activism, supra note 150, at 473-74; see also Jill E. Fisch,
Relationship Investing: Will it Happen? Will it Work?, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1009, 1020-25
(1994) (arguing that competitive pressures on institutional performance must be accounted
for in cost-benefit models of institutional monitoring); Helen Garten, Institutional Investors
and the New Financial Order, 44 RUTGERS L. REv. 585, 630-32 (1992) (arguing that it is
difficult to increase institutional activism).
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these lie in informational access and ongoing constructive criticism by
the institutional monitor."6 In practice, underperforming companies
are publicly identified in the ordinary course, and standard remedies
respecting investment policies, incentive schemes, and governance
structures are part of the conventional wisdom. To the extent that
institutions can cheaply tie the communication of these points to
credible threats against target managers, they can secure the available
set of governance benefits through a discrete engagement. Incentives
for more substantial investments in ongoing relationships remain
speculative, absent a special technical capability on the part of the
particular monitor. As a result, risks of perverse incentives and
commitment problems come to the forefront of the relational picture.
A strategically placed institutional holder could opt for side payments
from management in preference to public-regarding informational
development, or, given a hostile tender offer, the institutions in the
subgroup could defect from an implicit undertaking by management
to be patient.161
The practice has tended to fulfill the counter story's predictions.
Relational engagements have been discrete, cheap, and focused on the
short term. In contrast to the proponents' prediction that financial
incentives by themselves will induce subgroup formation, the selective
incentive of reputation seems to drive the practice. This implies that
contractual renegotiation of governance terms will dominate over
direct monitoring of investment decision-making as the means to
enhance value through shareholder participation.
B. Selective Incentives and the Pattern of Shareholder Participation
1. The Pattern of Discrete Intervention
Institutional investor activism is the successful grassroots political
movement of American big business. It began during the late 1980s
when institutions became dissatisfied with expanding legal constraints
on takeover activity. The access route was the precatory shareholder
160. See infra note 217. It comes as no surprise that the results of empirical studies of
returns on monitoring activities are inconclusive. See Fisch, supra note 159, at 1035 (citing
LILLI A. GORDON AND JOHN POUND, ACTIVE INVESTING IN THE U.S. EQUITY MARKET.
PAST PERFORMANCE AND FUTURE PROSPECTS, REPORT FOR THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM 44 (Jan. 11, 1993)).
161. For exploration of these problems, see Ayres & Cramton, supra note 19, at 1036-
39; Edward B. Rock, Controlling the Dark Side of Relational Investing, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 987, 989-99 (1994) [hereinafter Rock, Dark Side].
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proposal, 62 a medium for nonbinding, shareholder-initiated voting
proposals made available by preemptive mandate under the federal
proxy rules.' 6' The first generation of proposals concerned poison
pills, and urged management to exercise its privilege of redeeming
them or to submit them to shareholder approval."6  The first
sustained assault on the pills came in 1987, when a group of public
pension funds discovered the economy of scale and submitted
proposals at forty firms. The proposals received more than twenty
percent of the votes cast-significant returns given the historic pattern
of overwhelming votes against shareholder proposals."s
162. Management must include in the annual proxy statement precatory shareholder
proposals that meet Rule 14a-8 process and suitability guidelines. Proxy Solicitation Rules,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1994).
The process guidelines, set out in Rule 14a-8(a)(2) to (4), are strict-the proponent
is allowed only one proposal, submission must occur months before the meeting, and the
supporting statement is limited to 500 words. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(a)-8(a)2 to 3 (1993). The
suitability guidelines are stricter. They were drafted at a time when shareholder proposals
were envisioned as a medium for expression of concern on social issues related to
corporations, and exclude many business topics of prime concern to governance activists.
To wit, under Rule 14a-8(c), matters of "ordinary business operations," "election[s] to
office," proposals counter to management proposals, and "specific amounts of cash ...
dividends" are unsuitable; at the same time, a social proposal "not ... significantly
related" to the business also is unsuitable. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)5, 7-9 & 13 (1994).
The SEC alters its interpretations of these rules from time to time, opening the door
to issues concerning the operation of the business if it determines that the particular topic
has taken on substantial policy import. The Commission has not been notably consistent
in these determinations. Compare Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,418, at 77,284-87
(Oct. 13, 1992) (finding unsuitable a proposal recommending policy of nondiscrimination
respecting sexual preference in hiring), with Eli Lilly & Co., SEC No-Action Letter [1993
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) 76,629, at 77,682 (Feb. 25, 1993) (finding
suitable a proposal recommending adoption of price restraint policy by drug company
suitable) and AT&T, 1990 SEC No-Act LEXIS 20, *2-3 (Jan. 5, 1990) (finding proposal
for elimination of affirmative action programs suitable). This sort of nonsense has gotten
the agency into difficulties with certain courts. See New York City Employees' Retirement
Sys. v. SEC, 843 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (enjoining the agency from acting
inconsistently with its own stated policy in respect to the Cracker Barrel proposal), rev'd,
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,493 (2d Cir. Jan. 3, 1995).
Observers tend to see these suitability rules as manifestly unsatisfactory. See, e.g.,
Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 155, at 541; Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to
Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1155-62 (1993).
163. Under Rule 14a-8, the proponent bears the expense of making the proposal,
including legal expenses in the event of a management challenge to its suitability, but the
corporation bears the expense of including the proposal in the proxy statement. Proxy
Solicitation Rules, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1994).
164. Gilson & Kraakman, Institutional Agenda, supra note 32, at 867-68.
165. Rock, supra note 150, at 402. The players were the College Retirement Equities
Fund, the California Public Employees Retirement System, and the Wisconsin Investment
Board, loosely organized through the Council of Institutional Investors. Jayne W.
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The activists thereafter broadened the range of their proposals to
cover other takeover defenses"6 and, with proposals for confidential
voting, the voting process itself.67 By 1990, the voting pattern had
changed. In that year, 160 shareholder proposals received more than
twenty percent of the votes, and nineteen received more than fifty
percentl--the largest number of successful proposals in the entire
history of the device.' 69 The voting pattern respecting management
proposals also had changed.' 0 Although the overwhelming majority
management submitted in 1990 were approved, ten were defeated and
two were withdrawn to avoid defeat."' Antitakeover charter
amendments, overwhelmingly approved in the early 1980s, now passed
with only fifty to sixty percent of the votes.7
Institutional activists had arrived, led by agents of the California
Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) and other public
pension funds. After 1990, the subject matter of their proposals
broadened again, to include process and structure proposals designed
to make boards more effective in monitoring and designing incentive
Barnard, Institutional Investors and the New Corporate Governance, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1135,
1153 (1991).
Mark R. Wingerson & Christopher H. Dom, Institutional Investors in the U.S. and the
Repeal of Poison Pills: A Practitioner's Perspective, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 11, at 201-02, makes a counter suggestion. Given
the present control market in which takeovers tend to be strategic moves made by larger
players in a given industry, they argue that the shareholders' interest lies in leaving the
pills in place to facilitate lower-cost friendly transactions. Id. at 212. They thus ascribe
institutional pressure for pill redemption entirely to selective incentives. Id. at 211-22.
166. The proposals suggested prohibition (or requirement of shareholder approval) of
greenmail payments, opting out of antitakeover statutes, and requiring shareholder
approval of placements of large blocks of stock with management-friendly holders. See
Gilson & Kraakman, Institutional Agenda, supra note 32, at 868.
167. See Black, Agents, supra note 30, at 825-26. Confidential voting assists shareholder
participation in two ways. First, confidentiality prevents management from punishing
private investment institutions that vote against it in the product market. Id. Second,
under the usual procedures, management's proxy solicitors are free to count the proxies
as they come in, identify no-voting shareholders, and resolicit their votes. If the vote
seems destined to go against management, management can withdraw its proposal.
Shareholder proponents do not have this privilege. Id.
168. Rock, Shareholder Activism, supra note 150, at 483.
169. Barnard, supra note 165, at 1156. Poison pill proposals received an average vote
of 42%. Black, Agents, supra note 30, at 828.
170. Management must submit charter amendments and fundamental corporate
changes, including liquidation, substantial asset sales, and some mergers for a shareholder
vote. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 242, 251, 271, 275 (1994). Executive compensation
plans must be submitted to the shareholders pursuant to exchange listing rules.
171. Rock, Shareholder Activism, supra note 150, at 484.
172. Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 155, at 571.
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arrangements.'73 More importantly, success caused the set of cheap
strategies to expand. It turned out that managers, once confronted
with majority or near majority votes for the institutions' nonbinding
proposals, or confronted with even the prospect of such a vote,
proved willing to open negotiations and make concessions, 74 either
by voluntarily adopting responsive measures or by accepting other
policy changes in exchange for the withdrawal of a proposal.7
Proponents took this advantage and gained negotiating access by
generating bad publicity without making specific proposals. They
publicized lists of underperforming companies 76 with the suggestion
that shareholders "just vote no" in that year's board election."
173. Suggested improvements included the separation of the functions of board
chairman and chief executive officer and outside director membership for the compen-
sation committee. Proposals respecting executive pay also appeared, after the SEC
reversed a position in 1992 and declared the subject matter to be proper under its rule.
See Staff Advises Shareholder Proposals on Pay Includible in Proxy Materials, 24 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA), No. 8, at 250 (Feb. 21, 1992). Shareholder intervention has
resulted in changes in compensation practices at ITT, IBM, Cincinnati Bell, and Avon.
Grundfest, supra note 32, at 931.
Institutional shareholder proposals continue to increase in number. See 9 CORP.
COuNS. WKLY (BNA), No. 22, at 4 (June 22, 1994) (reporting a slight increase in 1993 and
1994). In the 1994 annual meeting season (according to Georgeson & Co.), institutions
sponsored 69 proposals, up from 65 in 1993. Id. Of the 1994 proposals, 11 sought to
repeal classified boards, 10 concerned executive compensation, 7 sought poison pill
redemption, and 14 advocated confidential voting. '93-'94 Proxy Seasons Said to Show
Slight Increase in Shareholder Activism, 9 CORP. COuNS. WKLY (BNA), No. 24, at 4 (June
22,1994) [hereinafter '93-'94 Proxy Seasons]. There has been a change in the sponsorship
pattern, however. Labor unions have appeared as sponsors, backing 32 proposals in 1994
versus 9 in 1993. John C. Wilcox, chairman of Georgeson & Co., characterizes the unions
as "gadflies," because they repeat their proposals and do not seek to negotiate with
management before submitting them. Id. In another recent development, CalPERS, citing
an independent consultant's stock price study, has indicated an interest in encouraging
management to adopt "high performance" workplace strategies that accord workers more
rights and feedback. See id. at 1.
174. See Rock, Shareholder Activism, supra note 150, at 483. For example, K-Mart
accepted two proposals in 1990 and seven firms instituted confidential voting in exchange-
for withdrawal of proposals. Id.
175. Grundfest, supra note 32, at 932 (stating that in 1992, 31 firms confronted with
shareholder proposals negotiated their withdrawal). Institutional successes also have had
a noticeable deterrent effect on management proposals for self-protective charter
amendments. See Black, Agents, supra note 30, at 828-29.
176. See CaIPERS Lists 12 Companies in Effort to Focus Attention on Corporate
Reform, 24 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA), No. 13, at 420 (Mar. 27, 1992).
177. Grundfest, supra note 32, at 933. The New York State Common Retirement Fund,
the Public Employees Retirement Fund of Colorado, the New York State Local
Retirement Funds, the New York City Retirement Systems, and CREF have joined
CaLPERS in these campaigns. Id. at 867 & n.37.
Grundfest notes the cost advantages of these dialogic campaigns. The analysts collect
the basic information on performance and the costs of drafting and compliance costs of
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Proponents then would meet with management to voice their
criticisms and concerns. Results followed - chief executives were
terminated at two of CalPERS' 1992 targets, IBM and Westinghouse;
another target, Sears, took the institutions' advice about concentrating
on the core business and dismembered itself.179 A change in the
SEC proxy rules, promulgated in 1992 as a result of institutional
pressures, facilitated the new approach by permitting shareholders to
publish their views in the media without prior agency approval.'O
2. Explaining and Evaluating the Pattern
The institutional shareholders' record, thus outlined, confirms
that concentrated shareholders are not passive and can coordinate
votes to achieve results. Specifically, the rational apathy problem has
diminished substantially, reputational threats against managers have
14a-8 proposals are avoided. CalPERS estimates that a 14a-8 proposal can cost up to
$500,000, where a "just vote no" campaign costs $100,000. Id. at 911-12. However, the
device is not necessarily more effective than the alternative of a precatory shareholder
proposal directed to a matter of process and structure; the latter gained stronger support
than the former at the 1995 annual meeting of Philip Morris, a current institutional target.
See infra note 296.
178. Id. at 933. Heads also have rolled at Goodyear, Allied Signal, Tenneco, Shearson,
and Kodak. Id. at 882-94.
179. This sort of institutional pressure continued to be exerted through 1994, with
different results in different firms. K-Mart and Philip Morris were two leading institutional
targets. At K-Mart, institutions pressuring for the separation of non-core retailing
divisions caused the defeat of a company proposal (presented for approval at the annual
meeting) deemed not to go far enough. Months later, the board removed the embattled
C.E.O. from the chairmanship, but it retained him as president. See Joann S. Lublin &
Christina Duff, Managemen" How Do You Fire a CEO? Very, Very Slowly, WALL. ST.
J., Jan. 20,1995, at B1. Philip Morris experienced similar institutional pressure for division
of the company, but the internal politics worked differently. See infra note 296.
180. See Proxy Solicitation Rules, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1) (1994). The earlier rules
prohibited solicitation of more than 10 other shareholders without advance clearance. The
revised rules also cut back on management agenda control in the proxy solicitation itself
by (1) permitting shareholders to vote in board elections for a combination of management
nominees and outside challengers, and (2) allowing shareholders to oppose a single
management proposal without being required to vote for or against an entire slate of
proposals. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(a)-4(b) (1994). The former change facilitates the possibility
of campaigns for select numbers of institutionally nominated directors. See Ronald J.
Gilson et al., How the Proxy Rules Discourage Constructive Engagement. Regulatory
Barriers to Electing a Minority of Directors, 17 J. CORP. L. 29, 33-42 (1991). The latter
change prevents the bundling of a proposal to which shareholders might object with an
advantageous proposal. It does not, however, prevent management from conditioning the
approval of a proposal on the approval of one or more other proposals. See Fisch, supra
note 162, at 1169-70.
The revised rules have had some effect on the pattern of proxy contests. Institutions
now solicit proxies from one another when opposing mergers or corporate restructurings.
See '93-'94 Proxy Seasons, supra note 173, at 2.
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proved effective, and capture of institutional proponents has not been
a problem. Diverse incentives among the institutions, however, make
the wider attack on the collective action barrier a tentative one.
a. The Rational Apathy Problem
The rational apathy calculation broke during the 1980s when
newly concentrated holders encountered takeover-related voting issues
with substantial financial implications. 8' Institutions thereafter
made at least minimal investments in information on governance
issues and showed some discrimination in their voting."m The
network of activist institutions also became a point of information
exchange. Their public suggestions that votes in selected firms be tied
to performance entail the sorting of financial information for
rechannelling into the voting arena. This ameliorates a problem of
informational slack" in addition to securing leverage for
negotiations. Finally, the activists' success at extracting governance
concessions provided the wider institutional community with ongoing
incentives to stay informed, even as takeover-related incentives
declined in importance after 1989.
b. The Reputational Threat
The record also suggests a revision of the standard list of
corporate governance deterrents. As yet, most shareholder initiatives
have not employed threats of direct intervention in the form of
mandatory proposals"s or opposing slates of directors." Instead,
181. On this point, then, Black's "critical mass" has been reached. See Black,
Shareholder Passivity, supra note 155, at 588-89.
182. The institutions articulate voting policies in advance by type of proposal. See
Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered,
93 COLuM. L. REV. 795, 831-39 (1993) [hereinafter Romano, Pension Fund Activism]
(comparing public and private fund voting policies). But cf Louis Lowenstein, Why
Managements Should (And Should Not) Have Respect for Their Shareholders, 17 J. CORP.
L. 1, 19-20 (1991) (surveying the guidelines of one bank and finding that they crudely fail
to discriminate between well and badly run companies to avoid an appearance of
favoritism to bank customers).
183. See Levine & Forrence, supra note 47, at 185-91. CalPERS's list of underperfor-
ming firms amounts to a "fire alarm" mode of oversight that supplements the "police
patrolling" of the independent directors. See McCubbins et al., supra note 89, at 273-74.
The fire alarm realigns the outside directors' incentives to make them more inclined to
challenge the managers. Id.
184. These are prohibitively costly under state law, and the extent to which the proxy
rules allow for them under Rule 14a-8 is unclear. See infra note 274 and accompanying
text.
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action is communicative. The shareholders as a group are invited to
join in a nonbinding request and their cooperation indicates dissatis-
faction with performance.'6 In the alternative, the proponent
announces performance dissatisfaction directly and invites others to
concur. None of these initiatives entails a takeover threat in the
present climate. Nevertheless, they result in preemptive negotiations
and concessions by managers,187 and, in some cases, prompt the
termination of the chief executive by the outside directors.
These shareholder threats appear credible because they impact
on the reputational interests of chief executives and independent
board members. The campaign declares that the target executives
possess undesirable characteristics," detracting from their standing
in the business community"s and, in some cases, from their
marketability. It can be expected that managers will be extraor-
dinarily risk-averse to such reputational impairment if, as seems
reasonable, we can assume that employment contracts are incomplete
and do not fully compensate for tenure insecurity and the costs of
changing jobs."9 Preemption by negotiation serves the managers'
interest by defusing the threat and providing them with some control
over the settlement process."'
More broadly, the appearance of a vocal shareholder interest
group changes the manager's institutional environment. The
institutions articulate a normative challenge to the manager's conduct
of the business." Their challenge has a more destabilizing effect
185. Dissident investors have successfully conducted proxy contests for board seats in
a handful of cases. See John Pound, The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate
Governance and Corporate Control, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1047-50 (1993).
186. It is not clear how discriminating the institutional voters are in this regard.
Confidential voting, once placed as a yes vote in a guideline presumably results in yes
votes in both well and badly managed companies. See Lowenstein, supra note 182, at 19-
20. The value of the signal depends on the discrimination of the activist gatekeeper. At
least one writer has assured managers that shareholder initiatives can be avoided through
good financial performance over the long run and direct explanation of any short-term
problems to the institutions. Robert C. Pozen, Institutional Investors: The Reluctant
Activists, HARV. Bus. REV. 141, 147-49 (Jan.-Feb.- 1994).
187. Pound, supra note 185, at 1057-61.
188. Grundfest, supra note 32, at 927-28.
189. See James G. March & Zur Shapira, Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk
Taking, 33 MGMT. SCI. 1404,1413 (1987) (stating that managers are concerned about their
reputations for risk-taking and are eager to discuss the deficiencies of others).
190. See Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 2, at 158-62.
191. See Gilson et al., supra note 180, at 45.
192. Firms are, from a sociological perspective, normative environments. Institutional
norms are rationalized prescriptions that identify social purposes as technical ones and
specify rule-like means to pursue these technical rationalities. John W. Meyer & Brian
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than ordinary external criticism, due to their equity investments, long
term presence, and ability to marshal votes respecting both present
and future matters for shareholder action. They represent an unstable
sector in the larger domain of institutional relationships with which
the manager deals." By negotiating, the risk-averse manager
1 4
seeks to stabilize and influence the relationship.
The shareholder threat can also destabilize the relationships of
inside managers and outside directors by reorienting the outsiders'
incentives. Ordinarily. the outside directors, being corporate players
themselves,195 see that their interests lie in cooperation with
management. However, shareholder intervention gives rise to a
public question about the outsiders' effectiveness, creating a dual
demand that has an impact on different components of the same
reputation. If the conflict becomes severe, the outsiders resolve it by
forming a coalition and exercising their board voting power to oust
the chief executive. Thus, publicity and reputational interests
combine to effect a transfer of control.
The occurrence of a number of such transfers in practice bolsters
the activists' credibility. These cases also represent an important
achievement: Since managers become psychologically invested in
their past strategies, chief executive turnover plays a crucial role in
prompting disinvestment in those strategies.'96  Furthermore,
Rowan, Institutional Organization: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. .
Soc. 340, 343-44 (1977).
193. See WALTER W. POWELL & PAUL J. DIMAGGIO, THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM
IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 30 (1991) (looking to extra-institutional sources of
institutional change as a complement to the internal interest group story of the firm).
194. See March & Shapira, supra note 189, at 1410-14 (suggesting that extreme risk
aversion can be expected). March and Shapira survey empirical studies on attitudes to risk
and conclude (1) that the managers do not see uncertainty about positive outcomes as an
important part of risk, and rather understand risk in terms of negative outcomes; and (2)
that managers do not understand risk as a probability concept, instead understanding risk
in terms of how much they might lose rather than the probability of loss. Id. at 1407. See
generally KENNETH R. MACCRIMMON & DONALD A. WEHRUNG, TAKING RISKS: THE
MANAGEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY 77-274 (1986) (reporting on a comprehensive survey of
senior business executives and studying their willingness to take risks).
195. See supra text accompanying note 15.
196. See Theresa K. Lant et al., The Role of Managerial Learning and Interpretation in
Strategic Persistence and Reorientation: An Empirical Exploration, 13 STRATEGIC MGMT.
J. 585, 588, 603 (1992) (stressing that heterogeneity of top management induces strategic
change and that managers in environments with constant change are more likely to change
than others in less complex circumstances); see also Paul C. Nystrom & William H.
Starbuck, To Avoid Organizational Crises; Unlearn, ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS, Spring
1984, at 53-60 (explaining that faulty cognitive structures developed by top managers
contribute to an organization's inability to deal with crisis, often requiring an infusion of
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organizational tenure has been accorded a principal role in explaining
the informational diversity, risk, and status quo preferences of the
teams of managers that run corporations. Long-term executives tend
to employ unchanging strategies and rely on customary information
sources. Teams with short tenures are more inclined to adopt diverse
strategies, look for new sources of information, and develop new
plans.'97
c. Financial and Selective Incentives
Shareholder engagements have followed a discrete, single-shot
pattern. Agents of public and not-for-profit funds take the initiative,
select targets, and make investments in communication and legal
compliance. Private sector agents of mutual funds, private pension
funds, management firms, banks and insurance companies follow the
leaders,'98 taking a selective, cost-sensitive approach. Larger private
players join in the dialogue when prominent underperforming
companies become successful targets. Otherwise, they discriminate
among specific issues according to projected short-term financial
consequences. A proposition with significant bearing on short-term
returns, such as a management proposal for a merger with a low
payout, might prompt an initiative. Other issues will not, with the
extent of participation in the initiatives diminishing with the payoff:
Poison pills rank above compensation plans, which in turn rank above
more general process and structure improvements.'
This division of functions between public and private institutions
follows from differences in the agents' financial incentives and the
institutions' product market vulnerabilities. Public pension funds tend
to be internally managed by civil servants who have relative immunity
to threats by managers. These agents' bureaucratic positions also lead
them to pursue risk averse financial strategies, since the public sector
new ideas in the form of new managers).
197. See Sydney Finkelstein & Donald C. Hambrick, Top Management-Team Tenure
and Organizational Outcomes: The Moderating Role of Managerial Discretion, 35 ADMIN.
So. Q. 484, 486-88 (1990); see also Jeffrey Pfeffer, Organizational Demography, in 5
RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 299, 320-26 (L.L. Cummings & Barry M.
Staw eds., 1983) (examining the effects of organizational demography on innovation,
adaptation and performance). But see Andrew M. Pettigrew, On Studying Managerial
Elites, 13 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 163 passim (1992) (providing a methodological critique of
this literature).
198. In 1990 public pension funds owned 8.3% of the equity market; private pension
funds owned 19.9%; mutual funds owned 7.2%. All of these percentages had increased by
1992. See Coffee, Half-Time Report, supra note 32, at 848-49.
199. Pozen sets out this pattern of response. Pozen, supra note 186, at 145-46.
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provides no special rewards for exceptional financial performance,
while financial failure can lead to punishment.m These funds, as a
result, are heavily indexed.?' Private sector agents, in contrast, run
the risk of management punishment for uncooperative conduct.m
They also have stronger incentives to pursue upside gain, which leads
them to trade more actively and worry about liquidity.' Some also
work under tight cost constraints that stem from fee arrangements
structured on the assumption of governance passivity.' 4
The different behavior patterns of public and private institutions
reverse the assertion of the financial incentive theory of shareholder
participation. In theory financial gain provides the incentive, while in
practice the less intense the financial pressures on the agent, the
greater the likelihood that the agent will take the governance
initiative. 5 This odd result dovetails with the more general point
that inevitable sharing of governance gains with free riders makes
governance investment irrational in a world in which the agent's
individual performance evaluation proceeds against the performance
of the market as a whole.' Together these points confirm the
prediction that shareholder initiative will follow from selective
incentives. Public sector actors, as civil servants, are unimpeded by
the private actors' cost, product market, and reputational disincen-
200. See Lowenstein, supra note 182, at 17-18.
201. See Coffee, Half-Time Report, supra note 32, at 860.
202. See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 32, at 913-24. Corporations, particularly corporate
pension funds, are a significant source of business for private managers. A well-publicized
confrontation with one management group can chill a business relationship with a similarly
situated group. Id.
203. Private pension funds tend to be "defined benefit" plans, giving the corporate
sponsor an incentive to maximize plan return to minimize the need for corporate
contributions. Public plans sometimes follow a "defined contribution" pattern, with no
connection between performance and contribution. Coffee, Half-Time Report, supra note
32, at 859. Romano suggests that possibilities for external political pressures on public
pension fund agents would diminish if all took the defined contribution form. Romano,
Pension Fund Activism, supra note 182, at 844-51.
204. Pozen cites 70 basis points per year plus a maximum performance fee of 10 to 20
basis points for external managers, and notes that all costs of dealing with the proxy
process come out of this compensation pool. Pozen, supra note 186, at 144.
205. There is a counter story to the effect that the indexed investor must invest in
systemic governance improvements due to the absence of the alternative of exit through
sale. See Barnard, supra note 165, at 1151-52; Gilson & Kraakman, Institutional Agenda,
supra note 32, at 866-67. The problem with this incentive story is that it neither accounts
for the behavior differential between the public and private sectors nor recognizes that
inactivity might nevertheless be a more rational alternative from the point of view of a
particular private sector agent.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 151-52.
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tives. At the same time, governance activity seems to suit them as a
mode of reputation enhancement. Given this phenomenon of reward
for power exercised over business actors rather than for financial
performance,' they are political entrepreneurs in both the tradition-
al and Olsonian senses.2
d. Credibility and Possibilities for Capture
A number of factors make public pension fund agents suitable for
this "public-regarding" entrepreneurship. The credibility of a
shareholder who proposes a cooperative engagement with
management is enhanced by a concrete commitment to a long-term
investment in the firm. The public agents' indexed portfolios give
them a long-term posture as a structural proposition. Their interven-
tions, accordingly, hold out no possibility of a hidden defection
strategy keyed to exploiting the management vulnerability that follows
from public targeting.' Nor, given indexing and the multiplicity of
institutional holders, is it likely that a proponent or group of
proponents could use voting power or the opportunity of access to
management to defect from the wider shareholder interest in
exchange for rents from the target. A particular pension fund agent
has reputational concerns that limit such a possibility to an end
period.210 The agent's ability to exercise a reputational threat
207. If the career patterns of the most prominent actors are any guide, job shifts over
to the private sector also seem to be a possible reward.
208. A second type of political entrepreneur also has appeared. This is a professional
intermediary who makes the good governance case to management from an inside
position. The intermediary argues that voluntary acceptance of a program of internal
monitoring procedures minimizes the possibility of becoming an institutional target. Two
prominent lawyers, Martin Lipton and Ira Milstein, take the prominent roles in this
capacity. See Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate
Governance, 48 Bus. LAW. 59, 67-75 (1992) (recommending the separation of the chief
executive and board chairman functions, longer and more frequent board meetings, smaller
boards, use of outside consultants, periodic evaluation of the C.E.O.'s performance, and
an annual meeting with the company's largest shareholders); see also Jay W. Lorsch,
Empowering the Board, HARV. Bus. REV. 107 (Jan.-Feb. 1995) (describing activist board
strategies).
The General Motors Board adopted a set of "guidelines" in 1994, drafted by Milstein.
These provide for annual evaluation of the C.E.O. but little else. See The GM Board
Guidelines, DIRECrORS & BOARDS, Summer 1994, at 5.
209. Conflicts over short term gain and long term strategy are entailed in these
engagements. These conflicts are discussed publicly, particularly where the issue is the
unbundling of a conglomerate.
210. That is, when termination of a particular relationship is contemplated.
Presumably, an end period results only when a given agent has decided to leave the field
of money management. Cf. Black, Agents, supra note 30, at 851 (observing that
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against management depends ultimately on the agent's ability to rally
votes from the wider institutional community.211 Since votes against
management remain the exception rather than the rule, the proponent
must husband its reputation to continue to play, selecting targets
carefully and representing the interests of the entire group of
shareholders in the engagement with management. Informational
slack seems unlikely to open up any room for self-seeking maneuvers.
The institutions operate in an informal network, and the managers
themselves remain ready to publicize any misconduct."' In short,
guardianship here is easily contested.
Competing demands on, and the possible capture of, agents of
public pension funds can more plausibly be hypothesized from a
different direction. The bureaucratic positions of public pension fund
agents make them vulnerable to pressure from constituency interests
frequently opposed to shareholder interests. Management is one of
those constituencies. These actors are, after all, agents of the same
governments that managers already have captured, at least within the
production of corporate law. Accordingly, political contestability
makes it imprudent to predict that this form of entrepreneurship will
remain vital indefinitely.
Roberta Romano has suggested that state-based concerns, such
as political pressure to support local firms and engage in other forms
of locally directed social investing, could limit the freedom of action
of pension fund agents.2 Certainly a close tie between a state and
a particular firm would create a conflict for that fund agent. As
Romano also suggested, however, these conflicting demand situations
are geographically specific rather than systemic. They therefore differ
from the more general threat of management pressure that still
controls private actors. Given a multiplicity of players, the conflicts
can be worked out within the network: The agent disabled by the
dual demand employs the professional's device of recusal, and the
other agents go forward. Romano points to a more systemic threat
to the leadership of the public pension funds when she recounts pro-
management political maneuvers to place pension fund control in the
shareholder engagement is a repeated game, retaliation against cheaters can be expected,
and money managers will rarely be in an end period with respect to one another).
211. Romano conducted a comparative survey of the voting policies of public and
private funds and found no statistically significant differences in voting patterns on process
and structure issues, and a common pattern on most social issues. Romano, Pension Fund
Activism, supra note 182, at 831-39.
212. See Black, Agents, supra note 30, at 817.
213. Romano, Pension Fund Activism, supra note 182, at 814-20.
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governors' offices in New York and California.214 These maneuvers
did not succeed, but they underscore the important point that
managers know how to organize themselves and make state
governments responsive to their wider agenda. Increased fund
activism, predicts Romano, will cause a concomitant increase in
political pressure on the funds' governance decisions.
21
It is hard to gauge the likelihood and prospects of a management
political initiative to break the pattern of public fund leadership.
Such a campaign would face several barriers. Here, unlike charter
competition, the employee beneficiaries provide a countervailing
interest. In addition, the funds with the most active postures come
from states, such as California, New York, and Wisconsin, with long-
standing antimanagerial political traditions.216 Finally, an initiative
would have to succeed on a multistate basis. On the other hand, since
the number of key states is small, it would be possible to knock out
the core players that provide essential resources to the network with
an initiative pointed to the leading jurisdictions. The likelihood of
such an attack would increase if takeovers returned as an issue in a
political posture replicating that of the 1980s.
C. Relational Modes of Shareholder Participation
1. Institutional Coalitions and Board Membership
Discrete engagements led by public pension funds only begin to
realize the benefits projected by the proponents of shareholder
participation. More significant results would follow if the institutions
formed coalitions and engaged with management to influence the
selection of board candidates, or, if necessary, proposed and elected
their own minority slates. This strategy's objective is not the
acquisition of board control, but the placement of clusters of monitors
whose reputational interests are tied to meeting the demands of the
shareholder interest. These inside shareholder representatives would
work to include performance incentives in compensation schemes,
develop additional sources of information and analysis, bring
214. Id. The governors presumably also had an interest in controlling the funds to be
able to draw on them in closing budget deficits. See Garten, supra note 159, at 639.
215. Romano, Pension Fund Activism, supra note 182, at 852. She concludes that
pension fund activities cannot replace an active control market as a disciplining force. Id.
216. CalPERS enlisted the press in fighting off the attack against it, charging that the
state was attempting to silence the funds' attacks on management. See Garten, supra note
159, at 639.
1918 [Vol. 73
1995] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1919
heterogeneity of opinion to board deliberations, watch the managers
closely, and, in cases of persistent failure, build boardroom coalitions
to replace the managers.217
This strategy could be implemented in either of two ways. First,
the institutions could voluntarily subscribe to a clearing house that
would select candidates and solicit proxies for them.21 Second, the
concentration of institutional holdings could increase to a level that
would make the formation of informal institutional voting coalitions
more feasible.2"9  Unfortunately, no movement toward the
realization of either strategy seems to exist in practice. No volunteers
have come forward to organize a governance association, nor have the
proportionate holdings of individual institutions risen to a point that
small subgroups have a stronger voting influence.m The present
disposition of institutional incentives heralds no change. All the cost
217. See Gordon, Cumulative Voting, supra note 148, at 133-42. Gordon does not think
that these institutional monitors should be selected with a view to competing with
management in the creation of investment and management policy. The hypothesized
monitors do not possess company specific expertise; aggressive intervention for structural
changes like downsizing could lead to adverse political consequences. Id. at 134-42; see
also Barnard, supra note 165, at 1165-68 (explaining that institutional investors and
shareholders lack necessary expertise to play an effective role in corporate governance);
Gilson & Kraakman, Institutional Agenda, supra note 32, at 880 (arguing that since
institutional investors lack the expertise for monitoring management, they must delegate
this function to outside directors).
218. Gilson and Kraakman propose an institutional clearinghouse that would develop
a pool of candidates. See Gilson & Kraakman, InstitutionalAgenda, supra note 32, at 883-
88. The amendment of the proxy rules permitting shareholders to split their votes between
the management slate and an opposingslate, see supra note 180, facilitates this strategy by
making it possible to run a slate for a small number of seats.
219. An intermediate strategy, the permanent shareholder advisory committee, has not
met with enthusiasm from either the commentators, see Barnard, supra note 165, at 1165-
68; Gilson & Kraakman, InstitutionalAgenda, supra note 32, at 871-72, or the shareholders
themselves. A proposal for an advisory committee made by Mr. Robert Monks at Exxon
received only 8% of the vote. See Charles F. Richards, Jr. & Anne C. Foster, Exxon
Revisited- The SEC Allows Pennzoil to Exclude Both Mandatory and Precatory Proposals
Seeking to Create a Shareholder Advisory Committee, 48 Bus. LAW. 1509, 1511 (1993).
220. The top 20 institutions hold 21% of American equities, and concentration falls off
thereafter. See Coffee, Half-Time Report, supra note 32, at 852. The holders of the 21%
hold sole voting authority as to only three-quarters of their blocks. Id. at 854.
Furthermore, the number of mutual funds continues to increase. Id. at 855.
A helpful contrast may be Britain, where the largest 25 institutions hold an absolute
majority of the shares. Id. at 854. A somewhat more active pattern of shareholder
participation follows from the higher level of concentration. In the case of a seriously
underperforming company, the four or five largest institutional holders of British firms
consult informally. The largest holder takes the organizing lead and takes the group's
concerns to the managers in the case of poor performance. See Bernard S. Black & John
C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation,
92 MICH. L. REv. 1997, 2046-53 (1994).
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and reputational disincentives that leave the public institutions in a
secondary role in discrete engagements also deter special investment
in monitoring. Additional disincentives deter the taking of larger
positions: Institutions continue to value liquidity, 1 and perfor-
mance pressures deter risky long-term commitments.222 The same
financial concerns deter the extension of public pension fund
entrepreneurship to the board membership politics. Given the
nonspecific, long-term financial gains of effective monitoring, the
disincentives make it unlikely that institutions will invest in board
election campaigns in the foreseeable future.
2. Monitoring by Block Holders
Recognition of the difficulties with the coalition strategy has led
proponents of shareholder participation to reconsider the possibilities
of an historically tested mode of relational investing, large block
ownership.m The model block owner is the legendary Warren
Buffett, a fundamental value investor who takes large, underdiver-
sifted, long-term positions; monitors carefully; but does not attempt
to interfere with the formulation or implementation of the business
plan, except in a crisisOtm This model actor's large equity in-
vestment plainly provides an incentive for active monitoring. It is less
clear, however, whether there are any incentives that might induce
existing investment institutions to make these large block investments.
Relational investors of this type appear only rarely in American
capitalism.'m  When they do, they are either individual
entrepreneurs; specialized, privately held venture capital firms; or
other large corporations.'m Gilson and Kraakman, drawing on the
venture capital model and a Swedish precedent, suggested a vehicle
for expanding the set of these players. They proposed that closed-end
investment companies be formed to take ten to thirty-five percent
positions in a number of salvageable companies. These firms would
221. Coffee, Half-Time Report, supra note 32, at 851.
222. See id. at 867.
223. Black cites studies showing a positive relationship between Tobin's Q (the ratio
of asset replacement value and market value of equity) and the size of ownership blocks
where the blocks are between 5% and 20%. Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional
Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 815, 918 (1992).
224. See Gordon, Cumulative Voting, supra note 148, at 129-30. Note that the
monitoring strategy duplicates that envisioned with coalition-based board voting.
225. See Louis Lowenstein, Opening Remarks, Columbia University Institutional Investor
Project Conference on Relational Investing New York, N.Y., May 6, 1993: "More Like
Whom?," 18 J. CORP. L. 697, 704 (1993).
226. For examples, see Rock, Dark Side, supra note 161, at 990-99.
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monitor actively and hold for long periods but eventually would turn
over their positions to cash in on the gains of effective influence.'
This proposal arouses standard institutional skepticism about the
projected financial returns: Absent any firm-specific expertise on the
part of the investor, competitive gains seem unlikely as a systematic
proposition? 8
3. Credibility and Possibilities for Capture
Possibilities of capture and defection raise questions about block
ownership's ordinary course suitability as a mode of shareholder
participation. Coalition-based board voting, in contrast, suggests
neither problem.
With coalition-based board voting, as with public pension fund
activism, the combination of cross-monitoring, reputational interests,
and contestability of guardianship provides a circumstantial guarantee
that participants will remain faithful to the shareholder interest. 9
Yet circumstantial guarantees of fidelity to the relational ideal of
patience and cooperation are less clear cut. It seems unlikely that
members of such coalitions could, or would, bond themselves to long-
term cooperation by committing, implicitly or explicitly, to reject a
tender offer. Their legal duties and reputational interests lie in value
maximization for beneficiaries, with no fine distinctions being made
about short or long-term means to the end. Even with an implicit
commitment to the firm and institutional internalization of a norm of
patience, the incentive to defect from the coalition and accept an
attractive tender offer would be powerful.
This element of short- versus long-term instability does not
completely undercut the cooperative possibilities of the board voting
227. See Gilson & Kraakman, Investment Companies, supra note 149, at 995-96. They
hope for a 50% increase in the stock price over the holding period. The closed-end form
is necessary to secure a long-term commitment; the gain must, of course, be net of the
closed-end discount. Id. at 1005-06.
228. See Pozen, supra note 186, at 148.
229. See Black, Agents, supra note 30, at 817, 851, 855; Gordon, Cumulative Voting,
supra note 148, at 171.
230. Lowenstein reports that during the 1980s major British funds responded to tender
offers by holding collegial inquiries into the integrity and efficiency of target managers,
and, in fact, rejected a few tender offers as a result. American fund managers, pressed by
competition and fiduciary duty, always tendered. Lowenstein, supra note 182, at 10-11.
Another possible route of defection should be mentioned. The holder can threaten
a tende*r offer himself, as Mr. Kirk Kerkorian recently did with Chrysler. See Steven Lipin
& Dave Kanas, Offer for Chrysler May Signal Return of the Corporate Raider, WALL ST.
J., April 13, 1995, at C1.
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strategy, however. The coalition, by hypothesis, has the votes to
insert its monitors whether or not management consents in advance.
Thereafter, the structural possibility of a hostile attack gives
management an incentive to cooperate to the extent that doing so
decreases the likelihood of attack.
The block-owning monitor has a similar incentive to abandon
management when faced with a tender offer, but the monitor is also
more susceptible to capture by management. In this situation,
management can compete with the offeror by offering the holder a
side deal, exchanging additional returns on invested capital for a
binding commitment not to tender. 1  The holders' substantial
equity commitment creates an incentive to defect to the management
side, and at the same time it undercuts any reputational concerns
about serving the wider shareholder interest. Given financial rather
than political entrepreneurship, the incentives would appear to lie in
the opposite direction.
In the proponents' story, the block owner charts a course
between these alternative defections. It makes an implicit commit-
ment to management to reject an offer that lacks a basis in fun-
damental value analysis.P2  Thereafter, it plays a tit-for-tat
cooperative game, holding to its commitment to the extent
management performs, but standing ready to defect to an outside
offeror if management fails to deliver. 3 Meanwhile, a successful
cooperative relationship makes a hostile offer unlikely. Since the
block owner plays this cooperative game with multiple firms as a
going business, it develops a reputational interest for exercising its
judgment in a discriminating way when faced with a tender offer.?
It becomes a gatekeeper for good and bad tender offers.
The problem with this story lies in the complicated mix of
elements that figure into economic accounts of the sources of merger
gain. Tender offer premiums of the 1980s had multiple sources.
Under Kraakman's "joint gains" explanation, the offeror pays a
231. In the standard deal, the block holder receives preferred stock in exchange for a
stand-still, or gives management a call option. Indirect payments can come from
investment banking fees, other product contracts, or access to inside information. Rock,
Dark Side, supra note 161, at 1004-06.
232. See Ayres & Cramton, supra note 19, at 1041.
233. Cf. AYREs & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 13, at 26-38 (hypothesizing a tit-for-tat
cooperative game between government agency and regulated firm).
234. Ayres & Cramton, supra note 19, at 1060-61; cf. Gilson & Kraakman, Investment
Companies, supra note 149, at 1005 (concluding that the block investor that becomes too
activist loses friendly access and cannot sustain the business).
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premium to make up a discount between the equity's market value
and the intrinsic value of the going concern. Given a competitive
market, the offeror must make up the discount. Its profit comes after
the acquisition, from either (or a combination of) synergistic gains,
better management, or the resale of parts of the target in the market
for going concern assets?' s  Let us assume that all tender offers
correctly are typed as motivated by the pursuit of gains through one
of the three strategies, and consider the position of the block holding
gatekeeper as to each.
The tender offer motivated by synergistic possibilities does not
seem well suited to the block holder's business judgment, absent
particular expertise in the given production function. This leads the
block holder to a difficult reputational choice: Its relational
monitoring role, narrowly defined, does not require it to forego a
share of the synergy-motivated premium. Unfortunately, management
might view a commitment to patience and cooperation more broadly.
A side payment in exchange for refusal to tender would provide a
neat resolution of the holder's conflict, so long as the holders'
reputational interest lies more with cooperation with managers rather
than with a public-regarding appearance in the wider institutional
community. 6
The block holder's gatekeeper role would seem better suited to
tender offers motivated by gain through better management or resale
of going concern assets. In this case, the holder's superior infor-
mation about company practices enables it to appraise prospects for
management improvement; chances for gain through dismemberment
presumably will have been explored in the course of the relationship.
Even here, the holder's loyalty to the cooperative strategy will be
235. See Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of
"Discounted" Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 925-30
(1988). Kraakman followed financial economic theory in accounting for the discounts,
attributing them to either management misinvestment of free cash flows or systematic
imperfections in market pricing. Id. at 907-11. Other commentators abandon the limiting
assumptions of finance theory and cite downward-sloping demand in stock market pricing.
See Richard A. Booth, Discounts and Other Mysteries of Corporate Finance, 79 CAL. L.
REV. 1053, 1095-97 (1991); Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums?
Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1259-75 (1990).
236. We note that hopes for synergistic gains and other management-driven objectives
figure prominently in the recent revival of merger and acquisition activity. A few
transactions have entailed hostile bids, but most have been friendly. See Randall Smith
& Greg Steinmetz, Mergers Surge as Firms Find a Rising Economy and Cheap Financing,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 1994, at Al; Mergers in America: Something in the Waves, THE
ECONOMIsT, Nov. 16, 1993, at 89.
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tested if, as Kraakman asserts, most of the premium comes from the
making up of the discount 7 If we open up the valuation theory to
admit a likelihood of overbidding by the offeror,"8 the conflict
becomes even more severe. The overbidding offeror leaves the block
holder with a choice between (a) cooperation and a payoff through
speculative governance gains that cannot, in any event, make up the
discount between intrinsic value and the market price of the stock,
and (b) a single-shot payoff that not only makes up the discount but,
given overbidding, clearly offers a greater return than that held out
by patient monitoring. Even given a reputational interest in integrity
in the gatekeeper role, the blockholder's temptation to defect and
take end period gains would be strong, particularly if a trend of
stepped-up tender offer activity held out possibilities of short-term
gain in similar investment positions. This scenario invites a res-
tatement of the two choices above: (1) defect, abandon cooperation,
and go into an end period; 9 or (2) adhere to the cooperative
commitment and take a side payment.2'
D. Summary
The foregoing discussion of capture risk respecting block holders
dovetails with the discussion of capture risk respecting agents of
public pension funds: The availability or effectiveness of either mode
of participation may be limited by historical contingencies, with the
likelihood of hostile takeover activity being a salient one. It is hardly
a coincidence that relational investing models found their way into
circulation after the lapse of hostile takeover activity in 1989. The
disappearance of the market deterrent both ensured an absence of
countervailing interest group demands that might have impaired the
public pension funds' freedom to take a leadership role in discrete
participation and made plausible the projections of long-term
cooperative participation by private institutions. The new cycle of
237. Kraakman, supra note 235, at 925-27.
238. Kraakman discounts this possibility. Id at 893-905. Others take the opposite view.
See Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 614-15
(1989).
239. The mid-1980s experience of bondholders holding portfolios of covenantless paper
in reliance on management's reputational interest in capital market access provides a good
example of this risk.
240. Ayres & Cramton, supra note 19, at 1059-61, recognize these problems in
suggesting that relational investing might help to forestall bad tender offers. We are less
sanguine than they about the possibility that the problems can be resolved for the benefit
of the shareholders as a group.
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acquisition activity that commenced in 1993 could, but need not,
materially change this favorable climate.24 Another salient contin-
gency is the relative level of concentration of institutional equity
holdings. Absent a marked increase of concentration in the industry,
we may not see the emergence of circumstances conducive to the
appearance of coalition-based relational participation.
IV. FEDERALLY MANDATED SHAREHOLDER INITIATIVE
The law reform agenda surrounding the institutional investor
movement tends to look in the federal direction. This is partly
because the proxy process is heavily federally regulated. Reform
initiatives already have prompted the SEC to remove barriers to
shareholder initiative 42 However, the reformers would like to see
additional changes that would shift more of the costs of shareholder
initiatives from the proponents to the firms. The primary agenda item
here is mandatory inclusion of shareholder board nominees in the
firm's proxy statement 43
241. So far, the new cycle is management-driven and friendly in most cases; see sources
cited supra note 236, indicating no significant change.
242. See supra note 180.
243. Without such a reform, the proponent must invest in its own proxy solicitation, a
prohibitively expensive process absent a control acquisition objective. For a recent
suggestion that this reform be undertaken by SEC rulemaking, see Coffee, Half-Time
Report, supra note 32, at 900-02. Coffee argued that multiple slates are unlikely, given the
instability of institutional voting coalitions, and noted that a minimum support threshold
could be imposed to deter overutilization. He also suggested that access be opened for
proposals counter to management proposals. Id.
Access proposals such as this have a long history. See e.g., Securities and Exchange
Commission Proxy Rules, Hearings Before House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821 & H.R. 2019,78th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-19,34-43 (1943)
(proposal for shareholder nomination in issuer proxy statement); Proposed Tender Offer
Reform Act of 1987, H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., § 6 (1987) (holders of 3% or
$500,000 worth of equity to have right to include own proxy materials and board
candidates); see also EISENBERG, supra note 14, at 117-21 (proposing that shareholders
holding 5% have the power to nominate directors in proxy statement); Louis
LOWENSTEIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL STREET: SHORT-TERM GAIN AND THE
ABSENTEE SHAREHOLDER 209-11 (1988) (proposing that shareholders have right to
nominate one-fifth to one-fourth of entire board); George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying
Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 881, 907-08
(proposing that a committee of 10 or 20 largest holders have exclusive access to proxy
machinery).
"Access" implies cost shifting. Cost shifting, however, could be directed without
access, on the assumption that the subsidized proponent proceeds with its own solicitation.
Bebchuk and Kahan recommend compensation for challengers both in board voting
contests and issue contests, with compensation for both board incumbents and challengers
made contingent on receipt of a threshold percentage of votes, and more generous
compensation for challengers in issue contests. See Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 96, at
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A broader federal law reform agenda also follows from the
financial theory of shareholder participation. This asserts that present
levels of institutional concentration could give rise to financial
incentives sufficient to induce subgroup formation if the federal
government removed ancillary legal constraints that increase the costs
and risks of collective action.2' We have no basis for controverting
this prediction, but, looking to the counter story and the practice, we
note a substantial possibility that the present economic structure of
the industry may, by itself, deter the appearance of the requisite
financial incentives. In the latter event, institutional shareholder
participation can be expected to persist only in a discrete form, with
reputational incentives figuring in significantly as inducements. The
possibility that the future framework for action will be thus limited
implies expansion for the law reform agenda-to increase the benefits
attainable through discrete action in addition to reducing the costs of
relational shareholder participation. Toward this end, we present the
following case for an incremental levelling of the field that state law
provides for shareholder initiative.
We propose a federally mandated privilege of direct shareholder
access to amend the corporate charter at the annual meeting of
shareholders, with cost-shifting to be effectuated through access to the
proxy statement for the making of proposals.245 We would limit this
1077.
244. The targets are: (1) disclosure requirements imposed on holders of more than 5%
of a class of securities under section 13(d) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988);
(2) liability of controlling persons for securities law violations of controlled persons under
section 15 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 770 (1988), and section 20(a) of the Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1988); (3) short-swing liability for trading profits of 10% holders
under section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988); (4) restrictions on
capital structures and incentive compensation for advisors of investment companies under
sections 18(d) and 23 of the Investment Company Act, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-18(d), 80-
23(a)-(b) (1988); and (5) portfolio diversification requirements under ERISA. See Roe,
supra note 34, at 26-27.
245. There will be ancillary problems respecting the proposal's preemptive reach.
States could nullify a narrow access mandate in numerous ways. For example, a code's
system of process and structure default rules could be reconstituted as a system of
mandates. Or a state could amend the process provision governing charter amendments
to differentiate amendments by source and require a supermajority for shareholder-
initiated proposals. We think that the proposal's inclusion of access for reincorporation
decisions provides a circumstantial guarantee against the former possibility. As to the
latter possibility, two drafting solutions suggest themselves. The preempting legislation
could either provide that a simple majority always suffices or provide that the required
percentage for a shareholder initiated proposal be no lower than that provided in respect
of a management proposal. The latter, less intrusive, approach should suffice, on the
assumption that no state would respond by amending its code to require supermajorities
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access privilege to matters of process and structure and exclude most
business matters allocated to the board by state codes.2' The
boundary dividing process and business would have to be drawn in
the preempting legislation.247 In drawing it, we would place contract
terms relating to management's incentives on the "process" side.
Thus, whatever the state law status, the federal law would grant access
for poison pill redemption and opting out of any state legislation with
an opt out provision, in addition to traditional process matters such
as the structure and composition of boards and committees. More
tentatively, we also propose access for substantive proposals res-
pecting executive compensation.2 However, cognizant of Professor
Jeffrey Gordon's appraisal of shareholder initiative, we would exclude
access to formulation of the business plan, in particular matters of
investment and disinvestment.249  Gordon has warned that
across the board.
246. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991) (requiring business of corporation to
be managed by or under direction of board).
247. State law draws a working but vague subject matter line between board authority
and shareholder authority that accords the shareholders a privilege of initiative respecting
by-laws, to the extent consistent with the charter and state law. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 109 (1991). Given the statutory allocation of power over business decisions to the
board, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991), the scheme implies a distinction
between business decisions and contract terms respecting process. However, the precise
course of this implicit boundary has never been defined. The problem is compounded by
the state codes' designation, see id., of default status to the allocation of business decision-
making authority to the board-the allocation may be constrained or redirected by charter
amendment. As a result, an open-ended mandate of shareholder initiative would hold out
the possibility of shareholder direction of all business matters.
248. These proposals carry a deterrent impact that could give the proponent useful
maneuvering room in the right case. See infra note 298. Yet they also create special risks
of abuse. The very maneuvering room they could create increases the risk that a
proponent might exchange the withdrawal of the proposal for private rents. In addition,
substantive compensation proposals would be particularly attractive to actors with political
agendas unrelated to shareholder value. Such a hostile, politically motivated proposal, if
directed to an extraordinarily well-compensated but effective manager, could destabilize
a valuable working relationship; that deleterious effect need not depend on a high
probability of passage.
We put this component of our proposal on the table for discussion based on an
appraisal that a big stick, placed in the hands of serious proponents, has a value that
outweighs the risks. Shareholders are habitually suspicious of both politically motivated
proposals and intervention against board business judgments; serious proponents,
accordingly, would employ this big stick only in extraordinary situations.
249. The combination of a green light for poison pill redemptions, compensation
matters, and opting out and a red light for other business matters could not be achieved
as a drafting proposition simply by excluding from access any amendment that removes
authority delegated to the board under the state code's general delegation. The permitted
subjects would have to be specified. One candidate for specific exclusion would be the
corporate purpose section of the charter. An amendment of the charter to exclude a line
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shareholder initiatives could have two perverse effects. First, given
diverse preferences, shareholder access could lead to economic losses
due to inconsistent choices; second, access could be manipulated by
shareholders pursuing private gain.' We argue that our proposed
boundary minimizes these problems."' Any problems of confusion
(or inconsistency) resulting from multiple proposals can be avoided
with simple process rules and a share ownership qualification. The
latter should be low enough to permit a small number of players in
the activist network to qualify a proposal and high enough to exclude
the gadflies.
On the technical point as to whether this proposal requires new
congressional legislation or could be promulgated as a rule by the
SEC, we look to legislation as a practical matter. The legislative
history of section 14(a) of the Exchange Act provides a basis for a
strong argument that the SEC does have the authority to impose
shareholder initiative on the states by rule. 2 That result depends,
however, on the theory of statutory interpretation the observer brings
to bear, 3 and a recent, notably restrictive judicial ruling 4 of
of business presently conducted by a firm would make all of its contracts ultra vires,
presumably necessitating the sale of the line of business.
250. See Gordon, Shareholder Initiative, supra note 29, at 361.
251. See infra notes 310-27 and accompanying text.
252. See Fisch, supra note 162, at 1170-74 (marshalling the legislative history in arguing
for shareholder access by rule); Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder
Proposals, and Corporate Democracy, 23 GA. L. REv. 97, 146 (1988) (conducting a
legislative history of § 14 and concluding that Congress supported "strong and active
shareholder participation in corporate enterprise within the general framework of
management-shareholder relations established by the general common and statutory law").
For other expansive interpretations, see Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 453 (2d ed. 1988); Roberta S. Karmel, Qualitative Standards for "Qualified
Securities": SEC Regulation of Voting Rights, 36 CATH. U. L. REv. 809, 824 (1987).
253. For a different reading, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Redirecting State Takeover
Laws at Proxy Contests, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1071, 1112. Bainbridge read the legislative
history to limit § 14(a) to matters of disclosure and leave substantive voting rights
unaffected. See also ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 366 (1986) (noting that § 14(a)
concerns disclosure and process and does not preempt or add to state law on existence,
distribution, or content of voting power).
254. Compare SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511,517-18 (3d Cir. 1947) (holding
that a corporation could not apply a by-law in such a way as to block a shareholder by-law
amendment proposal and implying a federally guaranteed right of access, albeit vaguely),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 847 (1948) with Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 411-15
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (invalidating the "one share, one vote" provision in Rule 19c-4, placing
a limited reading on § 14(a), and distinguishing between procedural and disclosure
regulations that facilitate rights to vote granted by state law, deemed to be within § 14(a),




section 14(a) has left the SEC with cause to be reluctant to ex-
periment with new rules 5  This uncertainty leaves us expecting
that any significant alteration of the federal-state balance regarding
shareholder voting will come through legislation. 6
A. Management Agenda Control and State Corporate Codes
1. Description of the System
Political theory tells us that legislative outcomes in electoral
democracies depend on the collective choice rule utilized by the
legislature--different process rules lead to different outcomes given
the same set of electoral preferences. 27 It follows that the actor
who sets the agenda can control the outcome, and that a particular
process institution's constraints on agenda formation have systematic
implications for outcomes." s
The agenda-setting procedures for shareholder voting in public
corporations have easily-described outcome implications. Control of
the proxy machinery gives management working control over the
mandatory shareholder board vote. 9  Shareholder votes also are
mandated for fundamental changes---charter amendments, dissolution,
certain mergers, and significant asset sales. Under the process rules
of most state codes,26° however, these matters may not be put
255. Cf. Coffee, Half-Time Report, supra note 32, at 876 (noting that the SEC vacillates
on the role of institutional investors).
256. We note that part of what our proposal seeks to achieve could be achieved by rule
on a relatively secure statutory basis. Specifically, the SEC could (and we think should)
amend rule 14a-8 to include by-law amendments.
In any event, we would recommend that any bill be drafted with specificity to reduce
the chance of ex post nullification in administrative proceedings. One grey area would of
necessity have to be left for case by case determination by the SEC. No complete, self-
executing definition of "process and structure" could be drafted as a practical matter.
While a concrete list of subject matter can be culled from the existing institutional agenda
and the state codes, novel proposals would occur over time, necessitating reliance on
agency administration.
257. See WILLIAM K. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION
BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 37 (1982).
258. See Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated
Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 48, 64-67
(1985).
259. As the foregoing discussion of barriers to shareholder voting coalitions implies,
management's practical control is vulnerable only to a challenger willing to invest in a
takeover or full-blown proxy contest.
260. For a survey, see infra notes 281-83 and accompanying text.
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before the shareholders until the board first approves a resolution.26
The condition of board approval amounts to a management veto-to
control the agenda one must control the board. The shareholders
have a veto in turn, but no access to the agenda. This absolute
control262 over the corporation's contractual agenda is subject to two
exceptions. One is the section 14(a) precatory shareholder proposal,
pursuant to which a shareholder who meets suitability requirements
can set an agenda item, but only for a nonbinding vote.20s  The
other is a state law shareholder access privilege respecting by-law
amendments,264 the utility of which is limited. By-laws may contain
any provision relating to the business or its conduct, not inconsistent
with the rest of state law or the charter.26  This means that
coverage of subject matter in the charter preempts contrary treatment
in the by-laws, opening possibilities for strategic tiering of provisions.
Management-protective exploitation of this possibility is a basic
corporate lawyering skill, extensively put to use in the drafting of the
antitakeover charter provisions of the 1980s. Some of the items from
the checklist of shark repellent provisions, such as poison pills266 and
provisions barring shareholder action without a meeting,267 had to
be placed in the charter as a matter of statutory mandate. Others,
such as staggered boards2-  and supermajority voting re-
quirements,269 might be in the charter or by-laws at the firm's
option. Management chose the charter, blocking amendment or
repeal at the instance of a shareholder challenger not yet in control
of the board but holding a majority of the stock or a majority of the
261. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, §§ 242(b)(1) (charter amendments), 251 (b)-(c)
(mergers), 271(a) (sales of substantially all assets), 275(a) (dissolution) (1991).
262. Management's process advantage in the event of a challenge, whether by proxy
fight or shareholder proposal, also remains substantial. It has wide discretion to invest
corporate funds on the defensive side, and with the help of proxy solicitors, maintains a
substantial informational advantage. See Black, Agents, supra note 30, at 825-26; Black,
Shareholder Passivity, supra note 155, at 593-94. Despite amendments to the rules under
§ 14, management still has some room to manipulate shareholder preferences by bundling
proposals. See supra note 180.
263. See supra note 162. There is an exception to the rule of nonbindingness for
proposals for new by-laws. See infra note 274.
264. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (1991).
265. See id. § 109(b).
266. See id. § 151(a) (providing that preferred stock contract terms go into the charter;
charter can provide in advance for "blank check" delegation to management of power to
authorize preferred stock and fill in terms).
267. See id. § 228(a).
268. See id. § 141(d), (k) (charter, initial by-law, or shareholder by-law; staggered board
has effect of barring action for removal of directors without cause).
269. See id. § 216.
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proxies.' Meanwhile, shareholder preferences respecting such
provisions underwent a change between the early and late
1980s-defensive charter amendments were routinely ratified during
the early period and resisted later on.271 However, the resistance
came too late. Defensive charter provisions were widespread by the
end of the decade. The new shareholder activists can beg for their
removal under Rule 14a-8, but, given the board veto on access to the
charter, cannot compel it.
The charter preempts the by-laws only to the extent that it
actually covers the subject matter in question. Technical possibilities
for shareholder-initiated contracting arise as a result. The charters of
public corporations, contrary to the vision of the contractual theorists,
did not contain many contract terms before the proliferation of
antitakeover provisions. The historic public corporation charter was
kept spare to provide management with maximum freedom of action
in formulating process rules.' The charter contained the minimum
terms mandated by the code and terms covering any senior equity
securities issued by the firm; by-laws contained standardized process
provisions; managers relied on state codes to fill in the rest. Firm
contracting evolved during the 1980s mostly to load charters with
defensive provisions. The shareholder agenda of the 1990s includes
new areas of concern, such as compensation schemes, confidential
voting, and board and committee structure. As to, these, the charter
may provide nothing, leaving open a field for shareholder-initiated by-
law amendments. Read literally, the suitability rules under Rule 14a-
8 permit by-law proposals, making an initiative cost-effective. 73
Some by-law initiatives have gone forward under Rule 14a-8, but,
unfortunately, this federal route to contractual access has not proved
useful to proponents. Technical questions of federal-state
synchronization have arisen as the SEC has dealt with management
270. At some point, procedural maneuvering by management to frustrate exercise of
the shareholder franchise violates a norm of Delaware law. That point is extreme.
Compare Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1121-22 (Del. Ch. 1990) (holding
that board action frustrating exercise of shareholder franchise requires a compelling
justification) with Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651,662-63 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(retreating from requirement of a compelling justification for such board action).
271. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
272. This is because charter amendments must by ratified by the shareholders, while
by-laws may be promulgated by the board. In an environment in which shareholder
initiatives respecting contract terms were rare events, it made cost sense to leave the
contracting to the board.
273. See Rule 14a-8(c)(1), which excludes matters that are not a proper subject for
shareholder action under state law.
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objections to by-law proposals. State law provides little guidance on
these questions, and, at least up to now, management effectively has
blown doctrinal dust into the eyes of the SEC.274
2. Explanation of the System
The rule of absolute delegation came into corporate law with the
turn-of-the-century shift toward an entity conception of the cor-
poration-a shift that had the incidental effect of affording freedom
of action to the managers of new, mass-producing firms.275
Previously, an agency theory of board authority had prevailed and
274. The suitability rules are built on three principles. First, the subject matter must
be proper under state law under Rule 14a-8(c)(1). Second, the subject matter must not
traverse a long list of specific exclusions devised by the SEC over the years. See Rule 14a-
8(c)(2)-(13). Third, following Auer v. Dressel, 118 N,E2d 590 (N.Y. 1954), a proposal on
a subject matter reserved to the discretion of the board under the state law delegation of
authority is nevertheless proper if phrased as a request. The three principles do not
synchronize well. There are two problems. First, a by-law proper under state law might
nevertheless traverse the SEC list of unsuitable topics. Second, state lawmakers have
never had occasion to draw a clear line between board management authority and
shareholder by-law promulgation authority. As a result, the extent to which a by-law may
constrain the board management authority is not clear. Nor is it clear whether the board
of directors, which also has power to promulgate by-laws, can subsequently repeal a by-law
approved by the shareholders. The no-action letters play out these problems with
conflicting results. Compare Exxon Corp., 1992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 281, at *1 (Feb. 28,
1992) (allowing the shareholder proposal to establish a committee to oversee the board
of directors to be excluded) with Pennzoil Company, 1993 WL 52187 (S.E.C.) at *82-84
(Feb. 24,1993) (original proposal) and Pennzoil Company, 1993 WL 87871 (S.E.C.) at *40-
42 (Mar. 22, 1993) (revised proposal) (suggesting that the shareholder proposal that by-
laws were to be amended only by shareholders was not proper under state law). For a
summary of the Pennzoil correspondence, see Charles F. Richards &. Anne C. Foster,
Exxon Revisited- The SEC Allows Pennzoil to Exclude Both Mandatory and Precatory
Proposals Seeking to Create a Shareholder Advisory Committee, 48 BUS. LAW. 1509, 1513-
18 (1993). In the former case, the SEC took a no-action position respecting a proposal for
a by-law mandating a permanent shareholder advisory committee, even though the
proposal required funding for the committee, arguably traversing the state law delegation
of authority to management. The SEC retreated from the position in the latter case, which
also concerned a by-law proposing a shareholder advisory committee. Upon resubmission
of the proposal on a precatory basis, the SEC still sanctioned the proposal's omission
because it contained a block against repeal by a subsequent board by-law. This, said the
agency, created a question as to state law validity.
The SEC's treatment of the Pennzoil no-action letter is somewhat counterintuitive as
a state law proposition. The state codes, read literally, imply that charter terms trump by-
laws, and that shareholder by-laws trump board by-laws, but the point is not clear. The
SEC's no-action letters thus have a perverse effect. They invite state courts to determine
the issue in management's favor should it come up at the state level. Given the charter
competition system, the states have every incentive to decide against the shareholders. For
further discussion, see Coffee, Half-Time Report, supra note 32, at 883-89.
275. See William W. Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. Rnv. 1471, 1489 (1989).
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access had been the rule.276 New Jersey, the early leader in the
chartering of large firms,277 conditioned amendment on board
approval before 1895.78 Delaware followed in its corporations code
of 1899,279 a piece of legislation that manifested its determination to
enter into charter competition with neighboring New Jersey.'
Access limitation provisions diffused into the codes of other states
during the subsequent decades. By 1960, twenty-five state codes
conditioned charter amendment on board approval; 8 ' by 1970,
twenty-eight state codes did so;' by 1993, forty state codes did
so.' Today, only ten state codes leave a door open to shareholder
access.
This historical sequence can be read as further confirmation of
the capture of state codes by the management interest: It is no
accident that this component of management agenda control dates to
the first instances of the purchase and sale of corporate codes.
Another plausible story has been offered, however. Jeffrey Gordon
has set out a functional explanation for absolute delegation, tied to his
observations that an open agenda could lead to costly shareholder
voting cycles and self-dealing by proponents of initiatives directed to
the firm's business.' The tie led him to a three-part argument that
276. See Gordon, Shareholder Initiative, supra note 29, at 349 n.7 (citing JOSEPH K.
ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS,
AGGREGATE §§ 297-99 (9th ed. 1871); 1 VICTOR MORAWETZ, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 243-44 (2d ed. 1886)).
277. New Jersey began to liberalize its code after 1890, with considerable financial
success. See CHRISTOPHER GRANDY, NEW JERSEY AND THE FISCAL ORIGINS OF
MODERN AMERICAN CORPORATION LAW 43-45 (1993).
278. JAMES B. DILL, THE STATUTORY AND CASE LAW APPLICABLE TO PRIVATE
COMPANIES UNDER THE GENERAL CORPORATION ACT OF NEW JERSEY AND COR-
PORATION PRECEDENTS 42-43 (1899) (reproducing New Jersey General Corporation Act
§ 27).
279. See Act of 1899, 21 Del. Laws ch. 273, § 135.
280. See RUSSELL CARPENTER LARCOM, THE DELAWARE CORPORATION 11-13 (1937).
281. See 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT. ANN. 230-31 (1960).
282. See 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT. ANN. (SECOND) 260-61 (1971).
283. See 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT. ANN. (THIRD) 1172-73 (Supp. 1993). The
MBCA count is 38. We disagree as to two omissions: N.Y. Bus. CORP. L. §§ 803, 804
(McKinney 1986), and UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-1003 (Cumulative Supp. 1994). Of the
10 states that omit the board veto, four allow a stated percentage of shareholders to
propose amendments (Idaho, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania); five have no
process provisions respecting amendment proposals (Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Ohio and Wisconsin); California, somewhat ambiguously, requires a board resolution
before or after the shareholder vote. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 902, 904 (West 1990).
284. See Gordon, Shareholder Initiative, supra note 29, at 357-61. For our discussion
of the cycling problem, see infra notes 313-27 and accompanying text.
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explained the statutory pattern as a result of evolutionary efficien-
cy.' First, if the absolute delegation rule had a significantly
negative effect on value, some states would offer an alternative.
Second, although many states do permit corporations to contract
around the delegation of business decisionmaking power to the
board,26 public corporations have not offered charter terms that
take up this option. Third, unlike antitakeover resolutions, which
have a negative impact on share prices, the absolute delegation rule
has a long historical standing that share prices already reflect. Citing
Jensen and Meckling's famous article on agency costs, Gordon
concluded that if the rule injures shareholders, managers bear the
agency costs when they initially sell stock to the public.
In response to the first argument, we note that a number of
alternative codes do exist, but we think that inattention by local bar
associations and other management representatives is the best
explanation for the isolated persistence of shareholder access
provisions. Given management agenda control over reincorporation
decisions,' no actively competing jurisdiction would include
shareholder access in its product package, even if access were thought
to have a positive impact on shareholder value.
We also question the probative value of the second argument's
point that public corporations have not exploited opportunities to opt
out of the absolute delegation of ordinary business decisionmaking
authority to the board. Agenda control follows from process
provisions that appear to be mandatory and is analytically distinct
from the statutory delegation of business decisionmaking
authority. 9 Opting out of the board authority delegation came into
the codes to facilitate shareholder-level contracting as a means to
police opportunism in closely held firms. The charter amendment
that makes use of this permission removes decisionmaking authority
from the board to the shareholder level. Such a broad-brush removal
is neither feasible nor desirable in a publicly held firm. A public
285. See Gordon, Shareholder Initiative, supra note 29, at 357-59.
286. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991).
287. See Gordon, Shareholder Initiative, supra note 29, at 358 (citing Michael C. Jensen
& William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976)).
288. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
289. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (1991) (charter amendments to be
approved by the board). This doctrinal distinction is long standing. See HENRY
WINTHROP BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 97, at 320 (1927)
(distinguishing between director and stockholder powers).
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corporation conceivably could exploit the permission by expanding the
set of transactions that must be submitted for shareholder approval.
However, doing so would not open the agenda to shareholder charter
amendments; instead, the charter would set the agenda, and
management would retain a degree of control over the initiation and
timing of the transaction eventually submitted to the shareholders 2 g
Finally, we question the applicability of Jensen and Meckling's
historical ex ante pricing model to this case. That model presupposes
a complete contract as to which all risk is priced out when the firm
initially goes public. We think an incomplete contract model inclusive
of ex post renegotiation of terms is more appropriate here. In
practice, firms go public at an early, entrepreneurial stage of their life
cycles. At that point, uncontrolled management influence over
decisions creates value, and no one worries about independent
directors and other process protections. 9' The shareholder par-
ticipation movement deals with firms at a later stage of the life
cycle-mature, solvent companies able to pursue failed strategies
because of weak capital market constraints.2' To have present
contracting processes determined by a risk allocation implied from a
public offering of a quarter or half century earlier seems
counterproductive.
In sum, state law's evolution to block shareholder access to the
corporate contract may raise a presumption of efficiency, but a review
of the history rebuts the presumption. At the turn of the century,
when the agenda control provisions came into the corporate codes,
corporate law was changing to facilitate investments of unprecedented
scope by entrepreneurial managers. Today, the picture is more
290. We note the possibility that a charter could be amended to remove to the
shareholder level the determination of the charter amendment agenda. Certainly this is
the inevitable result in closely held firms that move all business decisionmaking to the
shareholder level, as the statute permits. However, again, any blanket removal makes little
sense for publicly held firms. In the alternative, the charter could provide that
management's agenda power over charter amendments is subject to pro tanto limitation
in any case in which a shareholder proposes an amendment at a meeting. On the theory
that the greater includes the lesser, this provision would be valid. On the other hand, if
the agenda control provision were read as strictly procedural and not one of the "business"
matters under the basic statutory delegation, it would resist opting out and amount to a
mandate. That reading follows from the structure of the state code. Since shareholder
approval is mandatory for charter amendments, they are by hypothesis not within the
"business" in the exclusive delegation to management.
291. Indeed, a charter loaded with such terms might send a negative signal in an initial
public offering.
292. See Black, Agents, supra note 30, at 832; Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 208, at 74-
76.
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complicated. Some firms fit the paradigm of the productive
management firm, but many do not. Until the recent occurrence of
successful shareholder initiatives, the shareholder collective action
problem made it pointless to question access barriers. The question
finally comes up today in an economic environment in which we look
to the legal framework to facilitate disinvestment as well as in-
vestment.293 The implication for the state code's access barriers is
not efficiency, but obsolescence. 294
B. Shareholder Access to the Charter for Process Amendments
1. Benefits
a. Shareholder Participation
We direct our access proposal to the pattern of discrete
shareholder participation led by agents of public pension funds. We
project beneficial consequences on the following model of
engagement, abstracted from the practice pattern.295
Let us start with a proponent who publicly selects a corporate
target and either launches a negative voting campaign or makes a
precatory proposal. Public targeting indicates the proponent's
judgment that the influence costs at the firm are unnecessarily high.
If the proponent's determination has credibility, the targeting injures
the reputations of the firm's managers and makes it more likely that
the shareholders will obstruct future management proposals. The
managers have three choices as to their response. First, they can take
action amounting to a counter-signal showing that the proponent has
selected incorrectly and thereby rehabilitate their reputations.296
293. See generally Michael C. Jensen, The Modem Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the
Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 847 (1993) (arguing that firms able to
achieve disinvestment will be successful competitors in the coming era).
294. Gordon, Cumulative Voting, supra note 148, at 175-79, indirectly confirms this
point. Gordon sensibly suggests that cumulative voting could facilitate implementation of
institutional board membership. His proposal runs up against the access problem at the
implementation stage: Since cumulative voting must be in the charter, and the proponent's
only vehicle is the precatory proposal, chances for success are speculative at best,
295. See supra notes 181-208 and accompanying text.
296. Recent events at Philip Morris show that this is possible. A board coalition (led
by the previous C.E.O., a tobacco division veteran) formed to fight a proposal of the
incumbent C.E.O. (a food division veteran backed by the institutions) to split the firm into
its food and tobacco segments. This led to the incumbent's resignation and the selection
of a new C.E.O. from the tobacco division. The new control group took its strategy to the
marketplace, promising a more favorable dividend payout, and met a favorable response
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Second, if no such response is available and they are sufficiently risk
averse with respect to reputation and shareholder relations, they can
indicate responsiveness by starting a dialogue with the proponent.
Third, they can do nothing and let the campaign take its course.
Access to the charter gives the proponent more room to
maneuver in the second and third cases. In the second case, the
proponent gets a significant payoff only if the campaign's reputational
effects are severe enough to cause realignment of the firm's internal
coalitions and termination of the chief executive. Otherwise, dialogue
leads to a payoff in the form of contract concessions. At the
negotiations, the proponent has cost and reputational incentives to
make a quick deal and take home some sort of contract modification.
Management presumably will want to give up as little as possible in
the way of concrete terms, consistent with an appearance of respon-
siveness. Management, in addition, at all times retains the option of
noncooperation. The proponent, armed only with a precatory
proposal and reputational threats, is not in a particularly strong
position to extract meaningful concessions.29 If management has a
pending proposal of its own, a credible negative voting campaign
could mean a stronger bargaining position. Charter access lets the
proponent go past the negative, which depends on management's
agenda, and take its own mandatory agenda to the table. Armed with
a mandate, the proponent with credible vote-getting ability can close
off management's option of noncooperation. Furthermore, the
mandatory stick can be wielded directly against the managers'
influence within the firm as well as against their reputations: The
proponent, for example, could go to the table with a new incentive
in the stock price-a two percent increase against a market decline on the announcement
day. See Eben Schapiro, Philip Morris CEO Resigns Under Pressure, WALL ST. J., June
20, 1994, at A3; Eben Schapiro, Philip Morris Will Consider Stepping Up Buybacks or
More Aggressive Dividend, WALL ST. J., June 22, 1994, at A3.
Thereafter, the institutions continued to pressure the firm, with mixed results. Philip
Morris withdrew its poison pill in March 1995, responding to a 40% affirmative vote on
a 1994 shareholder proposal. At the April 1995 annual meeting, 25% of the shareholders
voted in favor of a proposal recommending limitations on benefits to outside directors.
A Just Vote No Campaign initiated by CalPERS did less well, however-management's
board slate was elected with a 96% vote. The C.E.O., meanwhile, continued to play the
dividend card, promising a lower level of earnings retention. See Suein Hwang, At Philip
Morris, 25% of Holders Vote to Slice Benefits of Outside Directors, WALL ST. J., April 28,
1995, at B4.
297. Grundfest, supra note 32, at 932 n.354, noted that the importance of concessions
extracted to date can be easily exaggerated. Confidential voting, as conceded by
managers, tends not to apply in contested elections; decisions to redeem poison pills do
not bar the board from adopting a new pill if the occasion arises.
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compensation scheme that reduces the manager's rents 98 In the
trade-off surrounding the proposal's withdrawal, the proponent can
select from the whole agenda of process reforms.2'
Charter access also could be useful in the case of a completely
unresponsive firm. Precatory proposals have no governance conse-
quences for managers willing to suffer the reputational consequences
of noncooperation and risk the long-term consequences of poor
shareholder relationships. Such a refusal to cooperate puts the
proponent in a repeat play situation. Charter access lets the
proponent raise the stakes in a second round, proposing an incentive
compensation scheme, or an amendment that redeems a poison pill
and calls for a shareholder vote as a condition of replacement. Such
a punishment campaign would, we suspect, have to be carefully
targeted,"° with the proponents concentrating resources on a
selected firm for a demonstration of enforcement power. A successful
demonstration would reinforce the importance of shareholder
relations and enhance cooperative incentives among the group of
targets as a whole.3°' Charter access also holds out the possibility
of short-term financial gain in some circumstances: Poison pill
298. A negative voting campaign also could have this effect if a compensation package
were up for a vote.
We note that the proposal in the example in the text is unlikely to be made in
practice. Information costs would deter investment in a full-blown compensation proposal.
Even if such an investment were made (or a simpler percentage cut in base salary were
proposed), probabilities for passage would appear to be low even with respect to a
manifestly underperforming company. Shareholder imposition of compensation terms that
materially reduce management rents is tantamount to a no confidence vote, and
presumably would be met in kind with reduced management efforts to reverse the fortunes
of the firm. The proponent's purposes would be better served in the ordinary case with
a proposal for a compensation committee, that is, a proposal packaged in pure process
terms. On the other hand, a shareholder privilege to make compensation proposals, even
uninvoked, retains a deterrent value. In addition, a substantive compensation proposal
conceivably could be useful to a proponent in a case in which management has been
iecalcitrant, the outside directors have been passive, the shareholders have become
noticeably dissatisfied, and no potential challenger for board control has appeared. In such
a situation, a proposal might either promote management responsiveness, prompt a
shakeup, or induce a control challenge.
299. See supra note 208.
300. A problem of information flow should be noted. A negative voting campaign
involves minimal informational cost. Mandatory proposals lifted directly from the existing
institutional agenda and fitting standing voting policies raise no significant informational
problems for the proponent. A more complex proposal, such as a compensation scheme
tailored to a particular company, would create more of a problem. Presumably, such a
target would have to be selected with care, and the campaign well-publicized.
301. Cf. AYRES & BRAITHWArrE, supra note 13, at 45 (suggesting that occasional firing
of big enforcement gun by a regulator might be more effective than frequent firing).
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redemption can make the stock price go up if a takeover is a
likelihood. The chance of gain might favorably alter the economics
of subgroup formation, inducing private institutional players into the
game on occasion. °z
The utility of a bigger stick that holds out an intermittent
financial incentive could increase over time. The current pattern of
discrete intervention turns on reputational incentives on both sides.
Reputational incentives can change with circumstances from period to
period. Pension fund entrepreneurship could diminish in intensity ift
as the roster of players changes, the replacements discover that most
of the available reputational gain has attached to the departed players
of the first generation. Management reputational concerns also could
change over time. The activists already have targeted the largest,
worst-managed firms. New targets will represent less obvious cases
of high influence costs, making noncooperative responses a more
likely possibility. Old targets, meanwhile, become repeat play
situations over time; as dialogue with institutions becomes an ongoing
fact of life for these firms, reputational threats may loom less large
and management's long-term concern about shareholder relations
matter more. A power to expand the mandatory agenda allows the
proponent to be more proactive.
b. State Law
Federally mandated charter access would ride atop the state
system, giving the shareholders access to the corporate contract but
not otherwise interfering with the production of state law. Taken
alone, it would not impair the responsive benefits of the state system:
Nor, taken alone, would it ameliorate the system's management bias.
Accordingly, our definition of appropriate shareholder "process"
amendments would include reincorporation proposals. We would set
up the following two-step process for shareholder-initiated reincor-
poration. First, the proponent's resolution would mandate the
convening of a committee of independent directors that would, after
consultation with an outside consultant," recommend a best
alternative domicile. Second, the following year, the shareholders
would vote on a resolution to approve or reject a move to the new
jurisdiction. We employ the independent director intermediary to
solve the problem of selection. Two proponents could suggest
302. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
303. Here we note possible income for legal academics.
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different states; a given proponent's choice could be uninformed or,
conceivably, could result from a side-deal with actors in the jurisdic-
tion chosen. In any event, public pension fund agents, being state
employees, do not seem well-suited to this particular gatekeeper
function. Of course, there remain possibilities for management
influence over the independent directors. However, since we make
this proposal more with a view to deterrent effects in states sensitive
to incorporation business than with expectations of frequent
utilization, we think the compromise workable.
The point of the shareholder reincorporation initiative, as stated
above," is to provide state lawmakers with a long-term incentive
to respond to shareholder interests. We doubt that it would result in
any short-term disruption of today's charter market. °" No state
presently stands out as a candidate for the role of shareholder-
sensitive charter monger. Indeed, Delaware's laggard role as an
antitakeover jurisdiction during the 1980s makes it a possible
shareholder-directed destination for firms located elsewhere. As a
practical matter, then, the deterrent of shareholder-directed reincor-
poration would complement the federal threat,3 6 reinforcing
Delaware's moderate legislative pattern and encouraging its judges in
their attempts to mediate between the conflicting interests.
The burden to make use of initiative to invigorate the charter
market would be on the shareholder proponents. To make active
competition work here, they would have to expand their
entrepreneurship to locate a jurisdiction, persuade it to go into
competition and invest in an informed judiciary, draft an attractive
code for it, and bring it some business. If all of that happened,
Delaware would face a dual demand that could produce difficult
choices. Moves in the direction of the shareholder interest to counter
the threat of exit by established firms could cause the state to lose
304. See supra text accompanying notes 141-47.
305. Had a federal reincorporation mandate been on the books in 1980 along with a
pattern of active shareholder participation, antitakeover legislation might not have become
so widespread. A few well-timed reincorporations might have deterred management
representatives from lobbying state legislatures because the shareholder interest would
have garnered a more prominent profile in lawmaking processes.
306. We would not expect this form of federal intervention to defuse the ongoing
threat. Any congressional move against the state system, however minimal, would break
a conceptual federalism barrier and imply the possibility of further intervention in the
event of significant state developments attributable to management influence. The short-
term effect, then, probably would be one of reinforcement.
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new business from entrepreneurial firms on the move to maturity, but
such conflicts are the ordinary incidents of active competition.
2. Unintended Consequences
We have designed our proposal to avoid two possible unintended
effects of shareholder initiative-rent seeking and vote cycling.
Jeffrey Gordon, warning of both, has concluded that initiative is not
cost beneficial. We argue that these concerns can be met through a
subject matter limitation and a few ancillary process rules.
a. Rent Seeking
On self-dealing, Gordon showed that, given concentrated
shareholding and unlimited access to the charter, there would arise a
risk of logrolling effected through shareholder side agreements that
direct the firm to suboptimal projects benefitting the shareholders'
businesses. Given dispersed shareholdings, Gordon projected that the
problem might arise whenever a substantial proportion of the group
of holders represents a distinct unity of interest-as when union and
public pension funds, or members of some political or economic
interest group, hold a large proportion of the stock 3 7 This latter
scenario would be unlikely to arise in the present context, given
prevailing institutional diversification practices and rational apathy
among small holders. However, Gordon also noted that the advent
of a regime of unlimited access could cause holding patterns to
change. At present, American firms having large block holders tend
to have only one such holder. That holder gains influence over
management and deters others from accumulating large blocks.3"
Unlimited access opens up possibilities for hostile coalition-building
by latecomer block holders, inviting a change in the shareholding
pattern.
We agree that the risks Gordon described are cognizable and
have little confidence that present fiduciary law could effectively limit
them. Accordingly, we leave matters of investment and disinvestment
out of our access proposal to delimit its utility to actors engaging in
governance activity in pursuit of short-term financial gain. The
practical cost to the shareholder participation movement, as presently
directed, is the foreclosure of direct action respecting disinvestment
307. See Gordon, Shareholder Initiative, supra note 29, at 376-79.
308. See id. at 374 (citing Harold Demsetz & Kenneth M. Lehn, The Structure of
Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155 (1985)).
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and corporate unbundling. Here, again with Gordon, we think that
dialogue and process reform work better.3"
It must be noted that the process and structure limitation
diminishes incentives for side deals without ensuring their absence.
Return to the above example of a proponent who threatens
management with a new, rent-reducing, incentive compensation
scheme. Although defined as process and structure, the proposal
remains susceptible to withdrawal in exchange for a side-payment.31°
The guarantee against such a transaction lies not in the subject matter
limitation but in the proponent's projected incentive proffle. So long
as the proponent comes to the role seeking reputational rather than
financial capital, trade-offs will be structured with a view to
reputational gain. Thus, a pension fund entrepreneur concerned with
vote-getting credibility can be expected to structure trades that entail
a concrete shareholder-beneficial component." Any additional
consideration sought by this actor will more likely take the form of
influence within the firm than the form of rent. Influence within the
firm, unlike money, gives this actor opportunities for further
reputational enhancement and at least holds out a prospect of
shareholder benefit. At the same time, even an undisclosed rent deal
creates a risk of reputational injury for the proponent.312
309. Interplay between unbundling and process reform can be hypothesized. The
proponent wants the firm to divide itself in two or spin off a substantial subsidiary. The
proponent is motivated by current conventional wisdom and is ill-informed. Management
resists. The proponent threatens management with poison pill redemption or incentive
compensation. If management concedes, the firm is unbundled. If management resists,
the proposal goes to a shareholder vote.
We do not view this possibility as problematic. In the latter case, the proponent still
has the substantial task of persuading the shareholders of the merits of the process
proposal. The proponent's inadequate information about unbundling does not bear
directly on that matter. In the former case, management will have had an opportunity to
inform the financial community of its case. If the case resonates, management has no
reason to concede.
310. We thank Jeffrey Gordon for noting this point.
311. Certainly, a secret financial cemponent could be a part of such a trade. But the
inclusion of such a component would not necessarily mean that the overall trading process
was detrimental to shareholder interests.
312. And for the target making the offer. Third parties report that managers at Philip
Morris, a leading institutional target, recently offered a job to Richard Koppes, the Deputy
Executive Director of CalPERS. Koppes turned down the offer. See Glenn Collins, Philip
Morris Meeting Subdues Tobacco Protest, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 1995, at D3.
This calculus might change during an end period, but the reputational deterrent
should still exercise influence. An actor might leave state service for the private money
management sector, or leave one state office to assume or run for another. In either case,
later exposure of a questionable trade could prove injurious. On the other hand, a pension
fund agent looking to a career in state politics might have a reputational incentive to trade
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b. Cycling
On the problem of voting cycles,313 Gordon hypothesized
corporate versions of a standard Arrovian voting cycle314 under
unlimited shareholder access. In his base case, we have three
shareholders, each of whom owns twenty-six percent. The issue is
unbundling. One wants to sell a division; the second-wants the status
quo; and the third wants a spin off, The preferences are ordered, and
a majority voting cycle results. The same, of course, could follow with
dispersed shareholdings.
for a geographically specific benefit, such as the location of a plant in his home state. But
the conflict of interest still bespeaks a need for secrecy, limiting the potential for political
reputational enhancement at home. Only an actor building a personal account for a
projected retirement seems to present a strong risk.
It also must be noted that a process and structure access privilege could provide the
medium for a threat by a financially-motivated actor. For example, a hostile large
blockholder could use a management compensation proposal (whatever the identity of the
proponent) as the occasion for negotiations keyed to rent extraction. But this possible
abuse, like that of rent extraction by a political entrepreneur, exists in the present legal
structure. Indeed, the blockholder's opportunities to extract rents follow from the very
existence of the shareholder vote. An access proposal limited to process and structure
does create additional occasions for rent demands, but we doubt that it would so alter the
underlying economics as to induce blockholding in the first instance or provide a
blockholder with a rent extraction opportunity that could not arise otherwise. Thus, at the
bottom line, our proposal's incremental aspect comes into the appraisal of the self-dealing
risk that attends it. Limited shareholder access serves mainly to strengthen the bargaining
position of one party in an established bargaining situation. The side deal possibility exists
already and is, indeed, intrinsic to any shareholder empowerment strategy.
313. Social choice theory, which began with KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND
INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963), asserts that majority rule can lead to any economically
and technically feasible outcome. Even if voters are other-regarding, so long as their
preferences differ, voting results will be unstable. Furthermore, there will be no basis for
assuming that voting results are connected with the preferences of the electorate. Id, at
22-33, 74-120; see also Richard D. McKelvey, Intransativitics in Multidimensional Voting
Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 472, 480 (1976)
(discussing global cycling theorem which shows that when majority rule breaks down, any
two points in space will belong in a cycle).
314. Given majority rule, it is possible to cycle through different preferences. Assume
that there are three players, A, B, and C, and three alternative outcomes, a, b, and c, and




The result is a classic voting paradox, that is, a lack of transitive social ordering.
Cycling occurs by virtue of the actors' preferences remaining fixed over time. With
multiple issues to be resolved simultaneously by a large number of decisionmakers, social
choice models show that cyclical majorities will occur in two-thirds of the decision contexts,
so long as logically ordered preferences are likely to emerge.
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However, voting cycles can be contained by process institutions.
Critics of social choice theory point out that its models suffer from
significant limitations; cycling becomes a problem only in the simplest
of majority rule institutions-without agenda controls, without
strategic voting, and with an agenda constructed on an ongoing basis;
in practice, agenda-setting institutions and agent sophistication
constrain majority outcomes? 15  So long as actors in voting
institutions take full advantage of strategic opportunities available to
them under those institutional rules, majority-rule voting cycles are
unlikely.316 Gordon, heeding this literature, acknowledged that the
cycling problem attending charter access could be ameliorated with a
process device that orders the agenda. He considered the possibility
of a rule that lets management set the agenda, as between the three
shareholder proposals. He rejected that device on the ground that
management ends up controlling the result, effectively returning us to
absolute delegation? We note in response that the device of the
independent director committee could be drawn on instead. The
procedure would be the same one we propose for reincorporation.
The shareholder proposes the formation of a committee to consider
the best means of unbundling the firm; the committee reports back
with its best proposal; the shareholders vote yes or no, with no being
a vote for the status quo. Since a choice must be presented,
management's agenda control is broken. The special committee
315. See Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 258, at 69; see also Kenneth A. Shepsle,
StudyingInstitutions, Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach, 1 J. THEORETICAL
POL. 131, 135 (1989) (arguing that cycling majorities are not a major problem).
For a survey of the anticycling literature containing a useful taxonomy of explanations
for stability or induced equilibrium, see DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO,
PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE 114-20 (1994). Green and Shapiro divide the existing accounts into
three groups. The first contends that equilibrium results from information costs and
legislative specialization caused by the existence of a system of permanent committees.
The second school of thought holds that induced stability results from a range of special
preference formations-for example, a quasi-concave preference distribution in connection
with a supermajority voting requirement. The third group, which includes Shepsle and
Weingast, asserts that stability stems from institutional arrangements. Green and Shapiro
add a few additional factors to the catalog drawn from outside the confines of rational
choice theory-computational difficulty, political infeasibility, and a regime of
metapreferences that works to avoid conflict.
316. Ole-Jorgen Skog, 'Volonte Generale' and the Instability of Spatial Voting Games,
6 RATIONALrrY & SOC. 271,282-84 (1994), argue that McKelvey's theory of global cycling
depends on the assumption that individuals are able to discriminate between alternatives
that are very close. In Skog's view, this assumption is unrealistic; if it is relaxed the
general instability of two-dimensional spatial voting games disappears.
317. See Gordon, Shareholder Initiative, supra note 29, at 363-64.
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serves the same cycle-breaking function here as does the legislative
committee. Of course, it would not guarantee the result of effective
shareholder choice. The committee could resort to subterfuge to get
the result management wants, reporting a manifestly unpalatable
alternative to the status quo. However, the initiative is destabilizing
nonetheless. The initial shareholder vote to convene the committee
signals that divisions of the firm may be up for sale. If the signal
were to attract a third-party offer, suppression by the special
committee would be substantially constrained.31
Given the availability of a process rule that restricts shareholder
choice, we are not at all sure that cycling need be a problem with
respect to initiatives on investment and disinvestment. As Gordon
also noted,319 however, consistency over time might be such a
problem: Shareholders could decide to invest in one period and
disinvest in the next period, with costly results. Given the problem of
asymmetric information, and the possibility of rent-seeking on the
side, we conclude that the risks attending initiative on matters of
investment and disinvestment are prohibitive.
Cycling could in theory occur with process and structure matters,
even though the immediate financial incentives that motivate the
shareholders in Gordon's examples would be absent. Conceivably,
one proponent could propose a compensation committee, a second
could propose a specific, self-executing investment compensation
scheme requiring no committee, and a third could propose a compen-
sation scheme resembling the status quo. However, no cycling would
occur here under our proposal, even though it would open the door
to any proponent or group of proponents meeting a threshold
percentage ownership requirement. We have included a process rule
that prevents cycling:3 Proposals only may be considered at the
annual meeting, and under the proxy voting system, proposals are
submitted for a one-round majority vote. The problem stemming
from unlimited access would not be cycling but inconsistency of
result-for example, both the status quo based and the new compen-
sation scheme could be approved. A breaker rule could be included
to deal with this problem. If management deems two proposals to be
inconsistent, it refers the matter to a third-party adjudicator. If the
proposals are then found to be inconsistent, the first in time reaches
318. See cases cited supra note 117.
319. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative, supra note 29, at 364-65.
320. STEVEN J. BRAMs, THEORY OF MOVES 187-93 (1994) (showing that there are very
simple ways to employ process rules to break.voting cycles).
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the agenda.3 ' Two candidates are available for this adjudicatory
role-the SEC staff and the independent directors' committee. We
prefer the latter in theory, but since any disputed matter would find
its way to the SEC staff in any event, the former amounts to the
practical choice. In either case, a result is reached and there is no
cycling. One problem remains: the possibility of inconsistency over
time32 and attendant costs.
3"
We think the consistency problem is minimal, even absent a
breaker rule. We envision a percentage ownership requirement keyed
to institutional holding patterns and set high enough so that two or
three institutions must coordinate their efforts in support of the
proposal. The idea is to rely on the practice pattern to ensure process
coherence. The leading players in the shareholder participation
movement have been motivated by reputational gain. Process
and structure initiatives that lead to conflicts with other institutional
players hold out little prospect of reputational enhancement.'
321. Here, a possibility for management manipulation opens up. If management hears
of a proposal, it arranges with a friendly shareholder to propose an inconsistent proposal
first. Assume that management wants to block a proposal for a compensation committee.
The management nominee would propose that the charter, which says nothing about
compensation committees, be amended to say the corporation shall not have a
compensation committee. The result is the status quo on either a yes or a no vote. To
avoid this problem, proposals that have a status quo effect would have to be excepted from
the first-in-time rule.
322. This problem easily could be treated with a provision that bars, for a period of
years, any subsequent shareholder initiative on the subject matter covered by a successful
initiative.
323. An extension of our proposal toward the territory of investment and disinvestment
should now be suggested. Access could be granted to amend the charter to broaden the
statutory list of transactions that must be submitted for shareholder approval. Under such
an access permission, shareholders could require voting for acquisitions effected under
triangular mergers, large asset purchases, and other significant transactions that presently
can be effected in the boardroom in many states. Such an expanded voting regime is
extensively discussed as a mandatory proposition in Lynn L. Dallas, The Control and
Conflict of Interest Voting Systems, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1, 47-71 (1992); see also Rock, Dark
Side, supra note 161, at 1023 (noting shareholder approval of special issue of preferred
stock).
Under a more aggressive form of this extension, the shareholders would have a
privilege to legislate not only a veto but a right of initiative. For example, a charter
provision might permit initiation of a merger or asset sale. At this point the line between
process and structure and substance is breached very clearly.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 200-08.
325. Cf BRAMS, supra note 320, at 118-19. Brains notes that reputation and moving
power are best understood in the same light: Where a player establishes a reputation and
the reputation is acknowledged by an opponent, "it may no longer be necessary for players
physically to cycle to 'prove' themselves. Mental moves will then suffice, and a player with
recognized moving power may then get its way without suffering the costs of actually
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Furthermore, in a case in which a proposal responds to a bargaining
impasse with a long-term target or complete noncooperation from a
new target, one would anticipate coordination and information sharing
among the institutions involved in the campaign.3 Finally, since
reputational gain here ultimately depends on vote-getting ability, we




This Article began by comparing the regulatory strategy of
enforced self-regulation with the historic alternatives of market and
fiduciary deterrence, commending self-regulation as a means to
cooperative solutions to corporate agency problems. Having surveyed
the emerging self-regulatory field, and after making a proposal for its
expansion, we close by noting the modesty of the benefits we project.
An experiment with process and structure access very well might
result in no significant changes, either due to sporadic utilization of
the access privilege, or a cooperatively based response by the larger
group of shareholders against the forcing of governance terms on
managers, except in extreme, end-period situations. In the alter-
native, extensive and underinformed utilization could conceivably
cause incentive or other contractual problems in given firms.
However, we think management-has sufficient resources and enough
of an informational advantage to protect firms from this problem. On
cycling." Id.
326. Here we draw by analogy on Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 258, at 64-69.
Shepsle and Weingast argued that legislative outcomes are not in flux, but display
systematic regularities, due in part to the disproportionate influence on outcomes of
members of powerful committees. Certain members, by virtue of the control over process
derived from their committee positions, are able to translate their preferences into
legislative action. Shepsle and Weingast call this "structure-induced equilibrium," which
means that an institution can be modelled as an extensive form game due to the
combination of process sequence and the identity of the individual players. At the bottom
line, the structure-induced equilibrium is an alternative that is invulnerable. The earlier
social choice models, in contrast, relied on an atomistic structure lacking the features
essential to understanding the nature and distribution of the actors' preferences.
327. We make this proposal for limited federal intervention without an expectation of
a favorable political climate. In fact, the proposal contains a takeover-friendly aspect that
would make it politically controversial. Shareholders could use it to force poison pill
redemption or to opt out of state antitakeover statues containing open-ended opt-out
provisions. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(b)(3) (1991).
Since access would facilitate shareholder defection in the event of a takeover, it also
would do nothing to ameliorate the problem that takeovers present for relational
shareholder participation strategies.
1995] 1947
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
our most sanguine projection, charter access, used responsibly and
occasionally, would bring process rules that lower management-
influence costs to a small group of mature firms. Our hope is that
competitive evolution would then take its course, so that other firms
voluntarily adopt the rules that work best. From there, we would
hope that responsible and occasional use of charter access encourages
ongoing contractual innovation, with all players contributing:
institutional agents, managers, and lawyers.
Some years ago, a corporate law debate over the desirability of
mandatory and enabling rules came down to simple difference of
opinion. The enabling side emphasized the importance of innovation
and flexibility; the defenders of mandates emphasized process
infirmities. The discussion here goes back to that point of difference.
State law has done an excellent job of assuring that firms can draft
contracts that accord managers freedom of action to invest and
disinvest, but it has not evolved to open up all possibilities for
productive firm contracting. State law remains the best vehicle for
realizing those possibilities, but a demand-side barrier prevents state
law experimentation. An incidental federal intervention taken to
facilitate the experiment will not hurt the state system, and it might
do the system some good.
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